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2ABSTRACT
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE WITH A GOVERNMENTAL PARTNER
CASE STUDY: COPPER MINING IN ZAMBIA
by
Kafi A. Annan
and R. A. H. Aitken
Submitted to the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science in Management
Theories of international investment suggest that the joint ven-
ture will receive increasing attention as a model by both host governments
and foreign investors. Its populatity has increased as the political
implications of 100% foreign ownership become more apparent and as
investors appreciate the economic advantage of having a local partner.
The terms of such partnerships are usually dictated by the political
and economic pressures of the time. Should these change, the basis for
agreement may well disappear, thus putting pressure on one or other of the
partners to renegotiate.
The paper reviews the history leading up to the 1969 nationalization
of the copper mining companies in Zambia. Evidence suggests that there are
conflicts within the resulting joint-venture which do not seem to have
immediate solutions. Even assuming d stable political environment in Zambia,
the pressures which exist already in the country may increase these conflkis
to such a proportion that a continuing relationship on the same terms be-
come impossible.
The authors undertook interviews of company and government officials
in London, Lusaka and on the Zambian copperbelt. These interviews are not
reported individually because of the highly political and confidential
nature of many of ~he opinions offered.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. R. D. Robinson
Title: Senior Lecturer
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6Chapter 1
JOINT VENTURE INVESTMENT - OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS
The international joint business venture has developed as an
important vehicle for foreign direct investment in all countries of the
world in the last twenty years - not the least in the LDCs where political
aspirations have not always provided the ideal climate for the vast injec-
tions of capital needed to stimulate economic growth.
Friedman and Beguin1 start their recent book on joint ventures with
a warning:
Many of the basic problems of contemporary foreign
investment in developing countries are independent of
the particular legal and business form chosen for the invest-
ment and they are therefore shared by joint international
business ventures with other forms of investment, when the
ownership may be entirely either in national or in foreign
hands. Problems of association between investors from the
developed world and the developing countries derive
essentially from the need to combine the minimum business
attractiveness for corporations which have many alternative
profitable forms of iilvestment, with the integration of the
investment in the general and economic plans of the host
country.
While not intending to deal with the major problem in depth, they
list the major objectives which must be considered in any joint venture
and between which some form of compromise must be reached. Those of the
host partner would be:
1. The joint venture must be integrated into the national
economic plan.
2. The foreign partner must be encouraged to bring in
capital in the form of cash, machinery or other assets.
3a There must be a training scheme with a gradual replace-
ment of expatriate manpower by local trainees.
74. Local resources should be used to substitute for im-
ports or to build an export industry.
5. Infrastructure should be developed as much a5 possible.
The foreign investorls objectives will be:
1. A return on investment commensurate with an investment
of that type.
2. Some form of guarantee of the investment.
3. Some special privileges to compensate for any increase
in risk.
But the objectives of the foreign investor may well be significantly
different if capital is already invested, if he is seeking protection of
sunk assets as opposed to being attracted into a new venture. In such a
case the bargaining position may well be changed, and it is necessary to
consider the pressures for any demands for participation, their background,
and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed partner.
A further environmental model which can be useful to investors is
suggested by Tomlinson. 2 Trying to describe the trend in attitude toward
Foreign Investment, he defines:
1. Unilateral Antagonism - the state of mind induced by
fear of the dangers of economic imperialism by investors
from developed nations. This often follows on clear
examples of exploitation by the foreign private sector
at a time when socialism and new-found independence may
be watchwords.
2. Mutual Suspicion - When a new country is struggling
with the problems of foreign exchange shortages, and
yet has to accept its own needs for modern techno-
logy, and its own inability to supply it. At the same
time the foreign investor appreciates the political
tightrope he may be expected to walk, even assuming
that the government with whom he is negotiating manages
to stay in power.
3. Joint Acceptance - Relaxation of suspicions as the
8investment is seen to play its part in economic
development, and as the investor finds that he can
look back on a period of minimal interference.
4. Sophisticated Integration - Growing economic and
political maturity may encourage investment - fiscal
incentives might do even more, in contrast to the
controls of earlier years.
Tomlinson based his research on ~uestionnaires sent to major British
firms who were asked to analyze the nature of their joint venture activi-
ties in India and Pakistan, and in particular to recall the basis for the
original joint venture decision. His categories are reproduced here since
they embraced the whole of his sample, no company having used the last
sweep-up option even though there is evidence that a few unusual reasons
have existed in other samples.
Reasons cited by British firms for choosing the Joint Venture form
of Investment in India or Pakistan were:
1. Explicit pressures by the host government.
2. Implicit pressures by the host government.
3. Desire to spread the risk of the venture.
4. The need for local facilities and resources.
5. Attracted by associatels project.
6. Local identity benefits.
7. Other reasons -
Without going into his analysis in great depth - and remembering
that the study concentrates on new investments and not readjustment of
existing ones - it is interesting that the most important single reason for
choosing a joint venture investment seemed to be the need for local faci-
lities or resources. If, however, the two types of pressure from host
9governments were combined, this single reason-of actual and perceived
government pressure - came out as most important.
Tomlinson also attempted to relate the answers he received to the
significant political dates in the histories of India and Pakistan, so that
he could obtain some understanding of the variations over time in the
reasons given for choosing a joint venture. Going back to his four-stage
environmental model mentioned above, it seems that the coming of indepen-
dence saw a marked increase in joint ventures undertaken for government
pressure reasons, and that by ten years after independence this climate
had already shown a tendency to return to a much less restrictive state,
when mutual suspicion and even joint acceptance were more usual.
Further analysis of the same data suggested that there was a
tendency for larger British investors to feel that they had been forced
into a partnership, while smaller companies were usually seeking the local
resources and facilities which they lacked - although Tomlinson was not
dogmatic on this point. It did seem, however, that those firms who felt
that they had acted under pressure also believed that they had little
opportunity to select their partner.
Finally, Tomlinson discusses the theory put forward by Hymer3 that
international direct investment is the result of bilateral monopoly, or the
bargaining between a potential foreign investor and a host government.
Under this theory the advantage would seem to favor the government as time
passed, since once the investment is made, and once education standards in
the host country begin to improve, so the investor tends to lose his posi-
tion of monopolistic strength. The facts of the oil industry bear this ou~
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where engineering advances have made exploration and refining less compli-
cated technically; but there are industries where advances in education
have not shown many signs of bridging the middie-management gap so that
an established company considering the joint-venture possibility m~ still
have cards enough to plqy at the negotiating table. The bilateral mono-
poly theory, however, should be considered in the light of Tomlinsonls
environmental model as well. As he puts it, carrots are preferred to big
sticks in all but the most extreme cases, and ac; the investment climate im-
proves, more companies will tend to choose joint-ventures for positive
reasons, rather than as defensive models. This increased sophistication of
host country governments is perhaps the most significant development in the
field. It may be that pressures exerted in the years close to independence
may be reduced in other countries, in which case, although joint-ventures
may still be favored, they may be selected on a more rational basis, and
with greater regularity.
If the joint-venture model is to be considered by a firm, either
as the structure for a new enterprise or as an adjustment of an existing
one, it is most important to be aware of the relative bargaining positions
of both sides, and perhaps some form of cost-benefit study might be helpful.
Such an approach has been recommended by Robinson4 who suggests that joint-
enterprises should be considered in the light of the synergy which they
generate, the confidence of parties in the measurement of costs and
benefits, and their appreciation not only of the controls required to
support their own case, but also of the perceived costs, benefits and con-
trols expected by the other prospective partner.
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Thus again the subject returns to an appreciation of the objectives
of the other partner, and it is useful at this stage to consider the kind
of problem areas which have arisen consistently in international joint
ventu res.
A good summary of the problem areas in joint venture management were
quoted by Bivens and Lovelr from an interview with a United States company
president.
1. Lack of thorough understanding by the local partners
cf your long- and short-range objectives.
2. Conversely, a lack of your thorough understanding of
of your local partner1s desires (many times a ques-
tion of poor communications or language barrier).
3. Conflict of interests particularly if the local
partners have oth~r interests which are interrelated
to the joint venture (e.g. joint venture provides
raw materials or components for partner's other
i nteres ts) .
4. Lack of full appreciation by your local partners of
your home office procedures, information requirements
and home office approvals.
5. Salary and compensation problems for a mixed local and
foreign management.
6. Generally limited capital availability from local
partners which affects growth of the venture.
7. Difficulty of integrating the joint venture marketing
policies with your overall marketing policies,
particularly in areas outside the country in question.
8. Difficulty in coordinating local marketing policies
in two different joint ventures in the same country.
In the light of so many areas of potential conflict, it might seem
that joint ventures presented greater operating problems and concessions
in control than might be warranted by the advantages perceived by investors
12
in the replies to Tomlinson1s questionnaire. But to look at a reduction in
equity holding from 100% to 49%, or even 25%, and to draw conclusions about
changes in control would be simplistic.
As Beguin points outl in his chapter on the control of joint ven-
tures, the extent to which majority ownership ensures real control of a
joint venture is open to question. There are many other constituents of
control which rnay specifically deny the power usually associated with
holding a majority of the shares in an enterprise. Probably the actual
holding of the host partner has more political than managerial signifi-
cance, and however delicate this situation may be, the foreign investor
must be clear in his own mind why a particular level of particiaption is
required by a partner, since the rest of the negotiations may well reflect
this desire. Thus voting control can be established with a minority of
shares by allocation of votes to certain shares in a disproportionate
ratio to their equity participation - as in the case of Pechiney in Guinea.
Equally board directors can be given veto powers which although not con-
structive as a management tool, at least prevents any structural change in
the investment, or any other action which could endanger their interests.
The existence of management contracts, often demanded by institutional in-
vestors who are providing loan finance, can also provide the degree of
control required, Finally, market restrictions might be required by
multinational firms who would attempt to protect their investments else-
where in the world. Allor any of these restrictions can be used - and
many more - provided both parties make clear their objectives at the
negotiation stage, and provided clear agreements are draw up to implement
~13
those objectives.
To summarize, existing or potential investors should be aware of
the political environment in which they operate, and should analyze their
reasons for maintaining or adjusting their equity position in the light of
such a climate. Durin~ any negotiations both sides should be aware of the
econOO1ic and political motives involved, and should atternpt to evaluate any
differences in peJ'ception of such motives, since what is a political neces·-
s1ty to one may be insignificant or controllable to the other.
A Government Partner
Throughout the paper so far there have been allusions to the impor-
tant role played by the government of the host country. The political
posture of the country was a major consideration in investment decisions,
and pressures exerted by the government are perceived to be important where
.~~.
the choice of the joint venture form - and even of the partner - is
concerned. It is perhaps surprising that, whatever weight ;s given to
Marxist ideology in developing nations and in their definitions of social-
ism, the government itself often sees fit to be a partner with foreign
investors. Dr. Nkrumah himself, for all his attacks on neo-colonialist
international companies, consistently stressed the view that the ideas of
socialism can., coexist with private enterprise - and how could it coexist
more clearly than as a partner 'in a joint venture? Friedman 6 explains
this trend by indicating those areas in which government is more suitable
than the local investor.
1. The 1oca1 e,atrepreneur may not be wi 11 i ng or ab 1e to
undertake the venture because the investment would be
too great, the risk too h1gh and the payoff too dis~
14
tant and uncertain.
2. Social and political ideas define certain sectors of
the economy as areas where the government should be
in direct control.
3. The growing complexity of certain social and govern-
ment functions require more independence from direct
ministerial intervention.
For these reasons the government may well decide to form a public
enterprise, often in the form of a development corporation, and it is then
committed to struggle with a problem which exists in any organization of
that type, and which developed nations fail to subdue after many years of
experience: this is the proper balance of managerial autonomy and poli-
tical responsibility. Friedman6 suggests general principles as follows:
1. Ministerial control should apply to principles only -
not to day-to-day management, and the 1il111 ts of tha t
control should be spelled out.
2. Direction from the minister should be open, not dis-
guised or infonnal, so that public and parliament
can be aware of the level of political interference,
and can evaluate the performance of politician and
manager alike.
3. Control should be coordinated by a development agency
with an adequate staff.
4. The government agency should not be treated as merely
another arm of government, but should be constituted
under its own statute, since regulation should not
necessarily be the same as for the civil service.
Bradley and McAuslin6 indicate some of the dangers of such govern-
ment development corporations and agencies, using East Africa as their
example. The rna:i n issues seem to be that very qui ckly a compl i cated
administration is built up with inadequate staffing and control. Too many
bodies do similar work, and too many personnel changes take place, largely
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because of the limited numbers of the local educated elite. The next stage
is that there are fewer and fewer members of the le~islature who are not
involved in some way with the administration of the various boards. Then
recommendations for mergers and rationalizations are blocked because of
vested interests, and coordination between the boards, so necessary if
development plans are to be successful, begins to decline. Further, the
complicated and ill-understood legal natures of the different agencies,
often with widely differing constitutions, make it difficult to keep within
the letter of the law, and the converse is unfortunately obvious.
To avoid these traps, governments would be well advised to reduce
the numbers of such development corporations, and also reduce the degree of
ministerial control. Those that remain should be coordinated more care-
fully, and they should be given a clear indication of their powers and
functions.
Finally, it would be wrong to suggest that a government partner
could not provide considerable benefits to a foreig~ investor beyond those
of perhaps being the only local investor who could provide the necessary
resources. Wi th the problems of governmental control mus t go certai n bene-
fits of communication or lobbying which might not be so readily available
to an entirely free-enterprise partnership. This might be seen to be most
important when a company constitutes a large sector of the economy, and
where changes in social conditions are important to create or maintain a
suitable environment for operation. The only major drawback to this
approach is that invariably political implications will receive (I very high
priority at quite low levels in the civil cervice of an LOC.
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Chapter 2
ZAMBIA - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTS
Political Independence and Ideals
To understand the climate in Zambia preceding the 1969/1970
nationalization the interests of the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) and
Roan Selection Trust (RST) , it is necessary to describe the major political
and economic events between Independence in 1965 and the invitation from
President Kaunda on August 15, 1969 that the mining companies should offer
a 51% equity stake to the Government.
Zambia was the last British colony to obtain its independence in the
sweeping lIwind of change" introduced by Harold Macmillan in 1959. The
collapse of the Central African Federation of Northern and Southern
Rhodesia and Nyasa1and was almost certain, given the supreme confidence of
African nationalists in the cause of majority rule, championed by Kaunda
and Banda; it is all too easy now to recognize the wisdom of Nyerere who
realized that the Federation was probably the only insurance policy avail-
able to the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia: without it they were
abandoned to the minority rule of the Smith Rhodesian Front party, to his
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and to the varying degrees of
oppression which have existed there since 1966.
Thus Zambia obtained independence in 1964 expecting to be the
spearhead of development for further African states in the South and then
suddenly found itself an outpost. The first whispers of U.D.I. had been
heard in Southern Rhodesia 1n 1964 when, objecting to being called a ~olony'
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and excluding expropriation as a course of action for the new government.
Since the British government had also been doing some research on the
legality of the original concessions obtained by Rhodes, and was also aware
of the level of feelings against BSAC, the company suddenly found that an
hands were against it.
Next, counsel for the Northern Rhodesian Government submitted their
firm opinion that the mineral rights of BSAC were not valid in law, since
in the original deal between Rhodes and the local chief, the latter had far
exceeded his sovereignty in transfering the concessions for areas over
which he had no control. This supported the findings of the independent
consultants and put the government in an entirely new negotiating position,
which it proceeded to strengthen by issuing a well-timed white paper. The
following day (September 1965) the question of compensation was finally
opened for discussion in London. The Northern Rhodesia government now took
the line that the BSAC no longer had bargaining stature in the case at all,
since the British Government was at fault in allowing the concessions in
the first place and should answer for its action. The conference in London
reached no conclusion, beyond a $4.8 million (contrast $103 million) offer
from the government of Northern Rhodesia to the British Government, which
sum would in fact be passed on to BSAC.
The company by now real i zed the weakness of its pos i ti on, and in
October they offered to accept $19.2 million in complete settlement.
Harold Wilson then further weakened the company position by a public state-
ment in his pre-election speeches refusing to assist BSAC financially,
stating that the company had received enough already. With independence
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largely because of the precedents it would set in other Commonwealth
countries, there was considerable dismay in the colonial offices in Lusaka.
By now it was 1964, and fears increased that independence might be granted
in 1965 without a settlement~ in which case it could reasonably be expected
that the new government would be under pressure to expropriate the royal-
ties, with the attendent risk to the credit rating of the new nation, and
embarrassing relations between Britain and her largest copper supplier, the
Oppenheimer mining empire. Meanwhile, new economists and advisors had
arrived at the Ministry of Finance and there followed a four-month period
in which no advances were made by either side; new strategies were prepared
and the government commissioned consultants from Britain to study the
economics and a senior counsel to review the legal position. Hall, at this
time editor of the Weekly African Mail which was read widely by Africans
throughout the country, published three articles entitled "Secret History
of BSAC Royalties. 1I Simultaneously, a UN/ECA/FAO report 10 had recommended
that Zambia should:
take over the mineral rights and collect the royalties
now imposed upon copper sales by the British South Africa
Company.
and
presumably, an independent government will not let
such quantities of foreign exchange continue to flow out of
the country, under an agreement originally signed 40 years
ago by the colonial office of a Government no longer
administering the terr1to~y.
The BSAC, meanwh1le g had been attempting to persuade the Hritish
government to guarantee its position by including passages in the new con-
stitution of Zambia, then being drafted, acknowledging the company·s rights
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feelings of the nationalists towards this arrangement. Add to that a com-
plete failure of BSAC to reinvest any funds in Northern Rhodesia ~
decisions of a South African controlled board - and a Zambian government
attempt to acquire the mineral rights was a certainty. Already, before
independence, the Northern Rhodesian Minister of Finance, a colonial
official, had perceived the inequities of the situation and started nego-
tiations which indicated a purchase price of about $103 million. Other
sources suggested that no more than $72 million could be reasonably
expected, since with the price of copper only just supported at $560 per'
ton, the royalties would cause the closure of two mines belonging to RST in
the near future. At much the same time, Oppenheimer, chairman of BSAC and
a major liberal force in South Africa, had realized the impossible natul~e
of the situation and had shown that BSAC was quite prepared to negotiate a
sale of the royalty rights on reasonable terms. Finally, a solution was
proposed to BSAC by the Northern Rhodesian Government in which the Govern~
ment accepted a net present capital value of $84 million to be paid to BSAC
in 22 annual installments of $5.4 million and one of $4.1 million, discoun~
ed at a notional 3 1/2%. Faber reports 9 that BSAC was prepared to accept
these terms, subject to four conditions.
1. That payments should be made in London in Sterling.
2. That there would be no obligation to reinvest the
funds in Northern Rhodesia.
3. That the payments would be exempt from United
Kingdom and Northern Rhodesia taxes.
4. That payments would be guaranteed by the British
government.
When the fourth condition was turned down by the British government,
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major theaters such as Vietnam and China. Thus the LDCs must rely on their
own resources to 1i ft themse1yes au t of the; r CUy'rent prob1ems, and i t Inay
be that Zambia has shown itself most able to do so, even if, with the
greatest wealth per capita of all under-developed countries,it has a flying
start.
Newfound Wealth and Suspicions - The British South Africa Company
Zambia produces 40% of the world's exports of copper, and ranks
third in production behind the USA and the USSR with 14% of world produc-
tion - about the same as Chile at pre-1970 output levels. In 1964 copper
prov; ded over 40% of Gross Domesti c P)"oduct and over 90% of export earn; ngs"
Thus any attempt to finance the development plans of President Kaunda1s new
independent government had to rely to a large extent on fiscal control of
this major sector of the economy and his plans began with an attack on the
royalty rights of the British South Africa Company. In name and associa-
tion BSAC was a relic of colonialism since it had been set up by Cecil
Rhodes under charter from Queen Victoria and 1889, when he had obtained
treaties from chiefs in Central Africa giving him exclusive rights over all
minerals in the region. A successor to the Rhodes Empire, BSAC had sold
concessions to the forerunners of the Anglo American Corporation and Roan
Selection Trust (AAC and RST) in the early thirties, and since that time
had collected about $384 million in gross royalties, paying about $96
million of this to the British government in taxes. It is suggested that
the outlay of Britain on the Northern Rhodesia protectorate over the same
period was about $12 million so that it is not difficult to understand the
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of Britain, t~e white minority began to demand sovereignty for their
country, a concession which Britain could not countenance in Africa in the
mid-60's considering the status of the other white minority, South Africa,
who had been granted sovereignty in the less infornled atmosphere of 1910g
The assassination of Verwoerd in 1966 saw the end of white isolationism
policies, with a more assertive Vorster believing that South Africa had a
strong economic role to play within the continent of Africa. This change
in direction had been preceded by six months by the overthrow of Nkrumah,
the idol of African nationalism, and suddenly Zambia had lost hope of
receiving real support in the moral war against white minorities; economic
survival became the immediate objective.
The details of this change are best told by Hal1 8 who suggests that
it was so dramatic because of the false impression Black Africa had of its
own potential. As he describes the independence movement,
No real battle had been joined to try its muscles. In a
score of countries independence had been a gift from metro-
politan countries resolved to shed their imperial burdens.
Nominal nations, bounded by arbitrary lines on the map,
possessed the trappings but not the means. In national
assemblies there was the regalia of European democracy with-
out the experience - even assuming the desires - to make the
system work. Development plans were drawn up, despite an
absence of skills to carry them through. Political philo-
sophies, based on various concepts of African socialism,
were often undermined by bourgeous attitudes inherited by a
new elite from its former white rulers.
While laying the blame for this situation firmly at the door of the
colonial powers. Hall admits that interest in the independent African
countries had also waned on the part of the other super-powers. Reductions
in Aid were the immediate result of increasing preoccupation with other
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celebrations only a few hours away, the Chairman of BSAC and the Common-
wealth Secretary of the newly elected Wilson arrived in tne country togffiher
and ultimately BSAC were forced to accept $9.6 million, half of which would
be taxed. Zambia was seemingly on the road to economic as well as political
independence.
But the BSAC affair had further implications. The team that worked
on the royalty case probably never expected that so much political ammuni-
tion would come to light, and by capitalizing on it they created an atmos-
phere of distrust which was to last for many years. Certainly it is felt
that this initial victory over the evils of South African international
mining interests colored the national perception of international investors.
Any politician was now assured credibility if he wished to make an issue
of exploitation by foreign investors, especially those with South African
contacts, and certain scholars managed to keep the issue well alive by
discussing the significance of interlocking directorates between the South
African mining world, and AAC and RST in Zambia. 9
Economic Independence or Dependence
Zambia was now assured of royalty income of $168 million from the
copper industry, whether collected as before in direct taxes on tonnage
mined, or, as the mining companies wanted, as a more conventional corpora-
tion tax which would not penalize the high cost mines. That the new govern-
ment would not accept the requests of the mining companies is perhaps an
example of the mutual suspicion described by Tomlinson. After the uni'la-
teral antagonism of the royalty negotiations it was perhaps psychologically
impossible to accept any recommendation from foreign mining interests, and
23
probably the logic was that any requests from that quarter should be turned
down on principle since they could not be in Zambials best interests by
definition. That the change was ultimately made as part of the takeover
negotiations suggests that, by then, the new government was better advised
of the implications, and better prepared to work in partnership with the
mining companies.
But the Zambian economy was still at risk, as far as future stabili-
ty was concerned. One factor already mentioned was the dependence for 95%
of export earnings and 40% of GOP on the copper mining industry - a common
malaise in Africa where colonial powers were undoubtedly more concerned
about developing raw material sources than in avoiding single product eco-
nomies. Bostock and Harvey14 provide an interesting table pointing up this
dependence on copper as compared with the other major copper producers -
Zaire, Chile and Peru. (See Table 1)
Taken by itself, and with the high price of copper prevailing
between 1965 and 1970, it would seem that the new Zambian government was in
a strong position to diver·sify the economy, since its strong foreign
exchange potential should allow high imports of capital goods and the build-
ing all-important infrastructure to attract foreign investment. But the
country still had two important weaknesses; one internal and the other
external.
At independence the total extent of the education of the Zambian
population of 4 million amounted to approximately 100 university graduates
and 1000 secondary school graduates. 12 Although most of the blame for this
Table 1
COPPER PRODUCTION IN MEMBER STATES
PARTICIPATING IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL OF
COPPER EXPORTING COUNTRIES 1965 (PERCENTAGES)
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Zambia
Congo
Chile
Peru
GDP
40
18*
4
2
GNP
34.0*
23.0*
3.0*
1 .5*
Exports
93
51
65
18
Revenue
68
45*
14
12
Employment
15
2*
3
1
*Estimated
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situation must be laid at the door of successive British governments, it is
worth remembering that from 1953 to 1963 the Federation of the Rhodesian
and Nyasaland was run from Salisbury by Welensky, and rnajor advances in
education for Africa~s were unlikely to take place in that environment.
Whatever the historical background, clearly the demands of government on
this limited elite were considerable in 1965, leaving few available for
commerce or industry, and although the main thrust of budget proposals
since independence has been towards education, it will be SOOle time before
investments at the secondary level and at the University of Zambia show
results. Clearly, then, Zambia must still rely to a large extent on expa-
triate technical and management skills, whatever the political and economic
impact of these shortages. But preci se ly thi s re1i ance encou,·ages the
continued existence of a two-level economy. Wage awards reflected the
demonstration effect of high expatriate salaries in the mining companies
and inflationary pressures generated by strong unions foll~~ing indepen-
dence. Bostock and Harvey13 show clearly the impact of the major conces-
sions granted by the Brown Commission in 1966, implying that although the
degree of spread between high expatriate salaries and low Zambian wages was
reduced, this was only accomplished at great cost. African earnings,
increasing at 12% in 1965 and 1966, jumped 39% and 18% in 1967 and 1968.
The total increase between 1964 and 1968 was 106% as against 53% for all
non-Africans. Perhaps more significant still, however, was that 106% com-
pares with a 70% increase for African miners implying that increases in the
mining sector following the Brown Commission were the signal for vast in-
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~reases averaging over 20% per year in the rest of the economy. In
isolation and considering the inequities of the compensation structure of
the country, no-one could criticize these changes. But considered within
the more compl ex system of Afri ca as a who1e the i rnpact was mu ch more
important. The breakdown of the East African Federation had many effects on
the Zamb; an economy, not the 1eas t of wh i ch was the end of the 1arge t ran ..·
sfer payments from the riches of the copper belt to the less fortunate
areas of Nyasaland and the acquisitive white government based in Salisbury.
In fact, between 1953 and 1963, Northern Rhodesia lost $240 million in
reserves, and at the break-up of the Federation was saddled with $230
million out of the Federal debt of $672 million - a debt which was largely
in respect of assets built up in Southern Rhodesia. Another e'ffect was that
for the first time Zambia - still then Northern Rhodesia - could begin to
protect small infant industries with tariff walls. But if these were ever
to become competitive in export markets - an essential move in Zambials
flight from dependence on copper - then labor costs must be competitive
elsewhere in the continent. Perhaps for, this reason Zambia has not pushed
her appl i cati on to joi n the Eas t Afri can COInmon Mat"ket fOnlled by Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania in 1967. Since that date, inflation has priced her
products far above those of her competitors.
The external pressure on the Zambian economy has probably had more
far reaching effects, even if these are not easy to quantify in total. On
November 10, 1965 Prime Minister Ian Smith made his famous Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (U.O.I.), and Zambia found herself at the front
line of a battle with an enemy who controlled her supply lines, many of her
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imports and almost all her electrical energy. The other independent
nations in Africa and the rest of the world clamoured for economic sanctiOffi,
while offering little financial help to Zambia, who perhaps stood to lose
more than Southern Rhodesia herself.
Before 1965 Zambials economy operated almost entirely on a laissez-
faire basis, with the minimum of currency or import controls, and little
government participation in industry or commerce. The first sign of con-
trol was the Exchange Control Act of June, 1965, followed in December by a
regulation requiring licences for all imports from all countries, thereby
implementing the United Nations Security Council IS Resolution on Rhodesia.
At the same time, exchange control regulations were introduced to restrict
payments to Rhodesia. But whatever principle demanded was not to be.
Zambia relied almost entirely on the railway line to the South through
Southern Rhodesia to Beira and Lourenco Marques, both for the movement of
imports and of exports of the precious copper. Prime Minister Wilson had
pressed Zambia to stop exporting copper through Southern Rhodesia, since he
did not want it said that Britain was relying on Smith for her copper sup-
plies in the face of the United Nations Sanctionls policy. Rhodesia
retaliated immediately by saying that all freight, both imports and exports,
would be blocked unless payment was made in advance in dollars or Swiss
francs. The copper companies~ meanwhile, had built up stocks worth over
$48 million, forecasting $240 million by the end of 1966 unless some relax-
ation were allowed, and fears increased that the price of copper on the
London Metal Exchange (L.M.E.) could crash when stocks began to move again.
The solution, the payment of freight charges by the companies into a Swiss
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bank account, was a necessary compromise, albeit illegal under new British
legislation prohibiting payments to Rhodesia. Thus the impotence of Zambia
in the face of enternal pressure from Rhodesia was clear for all to see.
But if Zambia lost the first round, the changes induced in the eco-
nomy between 1964 and 1971 were impress i ve. By 1970 imports frarn Southern
Rhodesia at $31 million were 7% of total imports com~ared with $87 million
40% in 1964. Ninety percent of the 1969 imports were coal from Wanki and
power from Kariba, both essential in copper production, but by 1971 Zambia
was expected to be self-sufficient in coal ~ and in 1975 the Kafue River and
Kariba North Bank projects should allow even further import reduction.
Transport, however, was less flexible. In 1968 the Zambian govern-
ment had to agree with the Rhodesian authorities to guarantee movement of
25,000 tons of copper per month via the railway system to Beira and Lorenco
Marques in return for an agreement that Zambian traffic would not be
discriminated against. Any signs that this agreement was being broken
would have led to drastic retaliation, such as a 50% surcharge imposed on
all imports for Zambia in February 1970 until the level returned to normal.
Meanwhile as many imports as possible have been routed through adequate
port facilities at Dar-es-Salaam and over the infamous 1000 mile road jour-
ney down the Tam-Zam road, suitably called the IIHe11-run ll by Zambians who
know of the appalling accident rates and the wear and tear on vehic1es and
goods alike. Matters improved slightly in September 1968 when a petroleum
products pipeline was completed between Zamb';a and Dar-es-Salaame The
strangle-hold of Rhodesia will be shaken off finally when the Peoples
Republic of China complete the $402 million Zambia-East Africa Rail Link
scheduled for 1975 - provided there are by then adequate handling faci1i-
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ties at Dar-es-Salaam. The cost of these constraints is calculated by
Bostock and Harvey14 as a 36% increase in the transport of exports and
133% in fuel costs. The 36% increase would be less than that for trans-
port costs of all imports, since some copper does go out by Rhodesia, a
much cheaper route than the Tam-Zam road to Dar-es-Salaam. The enormous
increase in fuel costs reflects the use of low grade Zambian coal which is
expensive to mine and produces only 84% of the BTU thermal efficiency of
the Rhodes i an eoa1 fr'om Wanki e. At the same time the low grade eoa1 danla-
ges smelter linings, so much so that it is now washed in a new plant,
thereby increasing thermal efficiency to 12,000 BTU against 12,500 for
Wankie, but at additional cost.
Clearly, mining equipment is an important input to mining production
in Zambia. The nature of the economy and its failure to develop good
engineering supplies has meant continuing reliance on South Africa, where
mining equipment is cheaply and efficiently produced. But Tanzania follows
a policy of strict sanctions against the aparthied policies of south Africa,
which means that no imports of machinery can come to Zambia via Dar-es-
,..
Salaam, thus forcing shipment through Rhodesia by road and rail.
In light of these cost pressures, added to falling ore grades at
Nchanga, (from 5.4% in 1964/1965 to 3.65% in 1969, which mine produces 30%
of Zambian copper and is the second largest open pit mine in the world), it
is perhaps not surprising that AAC and RST had reservations about committing
large amounts of new investment in Zambia. At the same time, there were
signs that the price of copper could drop from its exceptional 1969 levels~
making justification even more dubious, particularly in view of forecasts
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of overcapacity in copper-mining until 1973 or 1974. Finally, following
President Kaunda's Mulungushi speech of 1968, repatriation of profits had
been limited, and state participation in various other industries had been
requested.
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Chapter, 3
THE TAKEOVER ANNOUNCEMENT
The Matera Speech
On August 11, 1969 in Matera, a Lusaka suburb, President Kaunda
revealed his Governmentls decision to take 51% ownership of the two major
mining companies - Anglo American and Roan Selection Trust.
The move was not unexpected since earlier on April 19, 1968, with
a memorable understatement President Kaunda had said he was asking 25 major
companies lito invite the Government to join their enterprise. 1I As a direct
result of this so-called Mulungushi Declaration and the previous transfer
of assets from the colonial government, the state acquired through its
Industrial Development Corporation (INDEeO), a monopoly or majority inter-
est in a sizeable share of the economy: airways, railways, electric power,
coal, agricultural marketing, brewing, transportation, building supplies,
large scale consumer retailing and wholesaling, publishing, fertilizers,
hotels, oil pipelines, farm machinery, maize milling, tobacco marketing and
copper fabrication.
Since one of the main reasons advanced by the Government for the
far-reaching economic measures announced in Mulungushi was lIeconomic
independence," it had been obvious that the industry that really molded the
countryls economic future could not be left intact for any length of time.
Copper provided more than 95% of Zarnbials export earnings.
It is worth noting that, after Mulungushi, Zambian Copper shares had
fallen sharply, indicating that the stock market had been anticipating this
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possibility since April 1968, so it would be erroneous to suggest that the
August 1969 invitation came as a surprise. Although President Kaunda was
on record with denials that he intended to take over the mining companies
and apparently did not consult even his cabinet before the announcement,
after the event he offered the shrewd comparison of the need for secrecy
before devaluation. As leakages are a serious problem in the developing
nations (and Zambia is no exception), one cannot therefore caution ms wisdom
The takeover, or partial takeover, in itself did not come as a sur-
prise to informed observers of the Zambian economy and its political
philosophy. What surprised both the local and the international communi-
ties was the timing of the Presidentls announcement - a subject to be con-
sidered at a later stage. The Presidentls Matera speech not only indicated
the broad terms of nationalization and other changes that would substan-
tially affect the operations of the mining industry, but also provided some
background Of, at least, the official reasons for the takeover. For full
understanding of the Government1s attitude and traditional suspicions of
the Mining Companies, an extract of the Presidentls Matera speech is
reproduced as Appendix 1.
At Matera, the President began his speech by reviewing with great
satisfaction the progress and effective implementation by the Industrial
Development Corporation of the 1968 Mulungushi nationalizations and then
went on tj comment on Agricultural policy. Next, the President turned his
attention to the mining sector. He recollected his disappointment the
previous year and pointed out the almost complete lack of mining develop-
ment since Independence in 1964. Although at the time of independence the
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Zambian Government had taken over the mineral t';ghts of the British South
African Company, the mining companies still held the mining rights in
perpetuity. The Government levied royalties on the metal extracted but had
no control over the rate of extraction or development.
We as a peoplels government had legally no power to
take away their mining rights and offer them to other
Groups which were willing to commence new mining develop-
ments .... We could not tell the Mining Companies you
either develop the areas which you have or we shall take
them away from you and give them to somebody else who is
willing to do so. We could not even tell them we shall
take them away and develop them ourselves in the interest
of the Nation.
Here the President was referring to Clause 18 in the Constitution inherited
at the time of Independence, containing a guarantee against compulsory
acquisition by the state. This offending Constitutional Clause was repealed
by a referendum (in June 1969) and by Constitutional Amendment, thus clear-
ing the way for the fundamental changes the President wished to make in the
copper industry and in particular permitting the President to announce that
all mineral rights of whatever kind would revert to the state. In these
sweeping reforms the President replaced the complicated and out-moded sys-
tem of granting mineral rights via a system of prospecting, exploration and
mining licenses. Under the new system, mining licenses would be granted
for 25 years for the extraction of a proven deposit. These licenses would
automatically be given to cover the areas developed and about to be deve-
loped by the mining companies already in operation, the size of the area
covered depending on the rate of extraction and prospective plans.
furthermore, with new mines, the state would have the right or the option to
purchase 51% of the ownership of the mine at the time of granting of the
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mining license. As a direct result of this reform, prospecting and explo-
ration licenses covering various areas have been offered to a number of
different international companies, such as Suico, a consortium of Mitsui
Mining and Smelting Company and the Continental Ore Corporation, ~r~j
Italian, Romanian, and Yugoslav groups. There also are possibilit)es of
other companies coming in from the United States, Canada, Western Europe,
Japan, South Africa and Southern Europe.
On the question of taxation the President said:
Last year, I promised that I would review the royalty
formula and that I would base it on profitability in order
to meet the Mining Companies· point of view .... Instead
of Royalties and instead of the Export tax I ask the
Mining Companies to pay 51% of their profits in the form of
a new mineral tax which I intend to introduce ... (this)
is based on profit and in this I have met the Mining
Companies demands one hundred percent ....
The President continued:
... Comrades, I have given a great deal of thought to
the M"ining Economic Reforms which I have just announced. I
am confident that they cover every aspect of mining develop-
ment past, present and future and I have no doubt that they
will lead to an increase of mining investment. However,
when I opened the subject I said that I wanted the Mining
Economic Reforms to set the nation well and truly towards
Economic Independence. I do not think that this can be achieved
without the nation acquiring full control of the existing
mines, as it intends to do for the mines which will open from
now on. I have therefore decided that I shall ask the
owners of the nlines to invite the Government to join their
mining enterprises. I am asking the owners of the mines to
give 51% of their shares to the state .... I intend to
leave it to INDEeO to negotiate the value and terms of pay-
ment but again I want to make it clear that what INDEeD will
pay is a fair value represented by book valu~. At the same
time I want to make it clear that the Government has no
money to pay as a deposit against these shares ....
INDEeO will therefore have to negotiate payment out of future
dividends bearing in mind the advantage the shareholders
derive from associating with the state.
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Timing
What were the Government's reasons for deciding to take over the
mining companies at the time it did? It has been argued that the invita-
tion to AAC and RST to sell 51% of their shares was politically motivated.
That, however, is a truism, since politics and economics are less clearly
divisible in Africa than usual - a consequence of the colonial legacy. It
is correct that at the time, there was a generally unstable political
climate within the country and the ruling party. Both were divided by
factionalism and a major move such as the nationalizations could certainly
enable President Kaunda to assert his authority more easily over the rival
groups. This may have been achieved, for two weeks after nationalization
the Vice President, Simon Kapwepwe, announced his resignation as Vice-
President of the country and party. President Kaunda, acting with a light-
ening speed, announced that he was going to suspend its Constitution and
run the party as Secretary-General. Thus the timing of the takeover
announcement could be seen as providing President Kaunda tne necessary
leverage to take over complete control of the Party and to gain a breathing
space in sorting out the animosity between its factions.
It has also been suggested that the President might not have acted
as early as he did but for three encouragements - the ease with which
INDEeO had handled the first round of 51% negotiations in 1968, the final
success of the Congo Nationalizations and advice from Chile, this being the
culmination of a relationship springing from the 1964 meeting between
Presidents Kaunda and Frei.
In addition to these political factors, it would be fair to say that
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the President sought to maximize the national income benefit accruing as a
result of such a change, this benefit arising out of the added foreign
exchange, investment, employment and fiscal revenue that might be anticipa-
ted. The President had also mentioned other goals in economic diversifica-
tion, income distribution and economic independence.
Copper is the mainstay of the Zambian economy; almost 95% of her
foreign exchange earnings come from mineral exports. Furthermore 50% of
Government revenues come from the mining ~ndustry and an additional 20%
from industries based on it. The mines are relatively large employers of
labor, and employment in many other industries ;s dependent on the level of
activities of the mining companies and on their requirements. In these con-
ditions, therefore, the social benefits of increased mining production are
possibly higher than the private benefits. Consequently unless the fiscal
and physical control systems at the disposal of the government are such
that decisions made in the private interest are also in the public interest,
such decisions could lead to an inefficient allocation of resources.
To achieve these social benefits it was necessary to induce a more
active exploration and development program which would result in increased
mining investment, production and employment. This m~ be stimulated in the
longer run by the revised mining rights system and the redistribution of
prospecting and exploration licenses. In the shorter run, however, there
was need for increased production through capital expenditure in existing
nlines and the development of known deposits. The Government was confronted
with two choices - either to encourage this trend through indirect fiscal
and physical control mechanisms or to ensure its implementation by as~~ming
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direct control. It chose the latter as the quicker and the cheaper method.
Complete nationalization was ruled out since it was likely that the result-
ant disorders and disruptions to output would have reduced the social
benefits and these fears were reinforced when, at the subsequent negotia-
tions, AAC and RST conveyed at an early stage that if terms were too harsh
they might walk away and le~ve the industry to its fate.
Besides the po1it'ical and economic considerations it would be fair
to point out that RST and AAC had committed at one time or another soole of
the classic mistakes foreign companies often make, thus antagonizing the
host government. These would be:
1. Discrimination against local people in employment, compensation,
promotion and training opportunities.
2. Transfer of profits abroad; these are often deemed excessive in
absolute terms, in relatio~ to total profits, current invest-
ments, and inflow of capital. The profits of RST and AAC had
heen well over $240 million in the first four years after
independence, although the state skimmed off about $600 million
per year in taxes and royalties.
3. Inadequate reinvestment of profits and the use of the locally
generated profits to build up other foreign assets. It should
be remembered that over the past 14 years, while Zambian Copper
production has risen 80%, the total of new capital invested in
expansion still amounted to less than one half of the sum total
of dividends sent abroad.
4. Decisions of multinational companies that conflict with local
Government interests, negating development plan~ and thwarting
national aspirations. Such a case might be the proposed new
investments by RST anrt Botswana when no further investment had
taken place in Zambia.
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5. Size: The dominance of the copper industry in the Zambian
economy gave the two mining companies undue political power or
influence.
6. Discrimination against local people in selection or subcontrac~
ors.
7. Expansion in the private sector based on local borrowing:
advances by the banks rose from $19 million to $58 million in
the first three years after independence.
The President was painfully aware of these serious shortcomings in
the operations and activities of RST and AAC. At Mulungushi, sixteen montffi
earlier, he had castigated the mining companies as follows: 15
The companies claim that the royalty system has been
against new development. Nevertheless, I think they have
not done enough tONards further development of the country
in which they make their great profits. Let me also say
that I do not agree with the Mining companies that royalties
have been the obstacle to the development of the industry.
I have been following their accounts and I know very well
that they could have embarked upon further expansion if
they chose to divert part of their profits for this purpose.
Instead of re-investing they have been distributing over
80% of their profits every year as dividends. However, I
am going to change the royalty system. I cannot announce
details yet but I can say that the new system will give the
Government the same money while it will meet the companies
point of view. But at the same time I want to see more of
these locally made profits used in mining development ...
In terms of the incidence of tax the new provisions had minimal
effect on the companies. A 51% minerals tax plus the standard Zambian COITl-
pany tax rate of 45% (mineral tax being treated as cost) meant a total tax
-' rate on profits of 73.05% which was approximately equal to the rate paid by
the companies before the refonm.
Sir Roland Prain emphasized this point when he informed RST share-
holders that: "We welcome the establishment of the new principle of a tax
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based on profitability; nevertheless, a mineral tax at 51% when taken in
conjunction with income tax ;s high by world standards and has the effect of
actually increasing the amounts to be paid to the Government, compared with
the pres ent 1eve1, if and when copper pri ces fa 11 . II
This was a master stroke - a tax structure apparently reformed to con-
form to needs of mining industry and yet also gr~nting the Government the
same or more revenues, compared with the previous system. Thus all parties,
the mining companies, and political radicals, should be satisfied. Also by
announcing the new taxation rates, the future rate of tax on taxable pro-
fits was eliminated as a possible additional parameter in the nationaliz-
ation negotiations.
Another relevant point in the Presidentls speech dealt with exchange
control. In the 1968 Mulungushi speech the President announced that any
company owned by expatriates would be subject to exchange control regula-
tion. Such a company would be allowed to remit abroad in anyone year a
maximum of 30% of equity capital or one half of the net profits, whichever
was the lower. The purpose of this was to curtail the1undesirable tendency
of a number of foreign controlled companies to remit very large percentages
of their profits abroad each year. II This regulation was relaxed in the
Matera speech:
I wish to give incentive to those resident expatriates
to make joint ventures with Zambians in the Agricultural, the
Industrial and all other productive business fields. For
this reason I am prepared to relax the exchange control regu-
lations and I am prepared to consider that a company which
has 51% Zambian participation shall be treated as a Zambian
company for exchange purposes.
The mining companies, now 51% owned by the Government, were thus
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exempted from the exchange control restrictions.
Government Objectives
The main Government objectives for the takeover are discussed under
the following headings:
a. Production and Investment
b. Foreign Exchange
c. Personnel
d. Control
e. Econolni c Independence
Production and Investment
The investment policies of the mining companies had been far from
satisfactory from the Zambian point of view since independence. If the com-
panies were discounting the possibilities of nationalization at some future
date as inevitable, then there was little incentive for them to invest
more capital which might later be expropriated on unfavorable terms. The
companies were also anxious about soaring production costs and complained
that the royalties system inherited from the BSA days prevented the opening
of lower grade mines. The Government showed its disapproval of the invest-
ment rate by the companies and asked Chile for advice on ways to force the
pace of output. The purpose of the government move was to ensure the con-
tinuation of current production levels as well as expansion in the future,
through higher reinvestment in the industry and consequent expansion of
production capaclty.
Foreign Exchange
A serious area of conflict was the high proportion of post-tax
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profits paid out as dividends to the mainly foreign share-holders. In the
Mulungushi speech in 1968 the President made it clear that he regarded the
rate of development and reinvestment to be inadequate and introduced at
that time an exchange control regulation limiting the overseas payment of
dividends by companies that were less than 100% Zamb'ian owned to 50% of
post tax profits, or 30% of paid up equity, whichever was smaller. The
effect of this on the mines finances was to cause a large accumulation of
liquid funds (estimated at $84 million) in Zambia, despite increased
capitalization by both groups. As mentioned earlier, the restriction was
relaxed at the time of the takeover of the mining companies. Nationaliza-
tion can therefore be viewed in part as the quid pro quo for the relax~
ation.
Personnel
Another principal cause of friction between mining companies and
the Government was the question of the employment, training and promotion of
local personnel in place of expatriates. Except for the short-term loss of
efficiency as a new man settles into a job, local people in general cost
less than expatriates. This was recognized by the mining companies before
independence but their efforts to promote local personnel were frequently
frustrated by the white trade unions. Since Independence, however, there
had been a major exodus of the white South African and Southern Rhodesian
miners who had formed the backbone of the Zambian union movement. Thus
this stubbling block had been removed and the government could hope to use
the takeover to dictate the pace of Zambianization.
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Control
To Zambia it had become intolerable that an industry producing
nearly half the national product and virtually all the foreign exchange
earnings should remain under foreign management and ownership. There was
little that Zambia could do about the foreign management but it CQu'ld take
majority ownership and thus control the future development of the mining
industry. The Government also hoped to control the abuse of inter-company
transactions. Manipulation of prices in purchases and sale transactions
with associated companies can be used to transfer profits from one country
to another, thus avoiding taxation and exchange control regulations and
restrictions. The establishment of backward and forward linkages can be
del~ed if the foreign investor owns facilities in other countries. To
what extent this was applicable to Zambia is not clear. The Zambian Copper
Companies have not in general purchased significant proportion of inputs
from associated companies since they are more horizontally than vertically
integrated internationally. Also a high proportion of copper is fully
refined in Zambia, unlike the Congo or Chile before President Frei's
Chileanization program. Nevertheless suspicion of price manipulation was
one reason for the official reluctance to drop the taxation of copper based
on published price and tonnage produced and exported.
Economic Independence
There is a general belief in the underdeveloped countries that
political independence should be followed by economic independence and this
belief is partially shared by all countries. The Chilean, Congolese and
Zambian Copper takeovers are only examples of a much wider concern in
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Tanzania and Uganda as well as in Canada and France. Various names are
ascribed to these trends. Sometimes it is associated with socialism
(Tanzan; a) or a II move to the left" (Uganda) but Zambi a 's offi ci a1 ph i 1050-
phy of Humanism specifically rejects the doctrines of socialism. Despite
the current concern of the French and Canadian governments for economic
independence, one could hardly describe them as left wing. President
Kaunda drove home the point when he said at the opening of a new Standard
Bank Headquarters in Lus aka in 1969 that IIwe have confi dence that each
change brings us closer to our goal of economic and political independence
based on self-reliance ... those who want development with a human face
will come and join us as participants in this great ventu~e, which my
Government is prepared to undertake to its logical conclusion. 1I It should
be understood that the primary motive in many cases is economic independ-
ence rather than a move to the left or acceptance of communist doctrine.
In the Zambian case, for instance, one must note that large
foreign firms have been nationalized at the same time as small Zambian
businesses have been encotiraged, often to the point of driving out small
foreign businessmen. In both situations the Government is simply using the
most easily available instrument to achieve economic independence.
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Chapter 4
THE SETTLEMENT
On December 24, 1969, four months after the President's Matera
speech and after intensive negotiations, the final master agreements were
duly slgned by all parties. The terms of the settlement were as follows:
A. Compensation
The Zambian Anglo American Group announced the details of the
settlement in a statement to its shareholders on April 27,1970. The
Group·s assets, undertakings and liabilities of Nchanga, Rhokana, the
Rhokana Copper Refineries and Bancroft were consolidated into one operating
company, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, Limited (NCCM). The newly
created Government Mining C~~pany, MINDECO Ltd was to hold 51% of the
shares. Other Anglo Americ~n assets, the remaining 49% NCCM shares and the
compensation bonds were to be vested in a new company, Zambian Copper
Investments, Ltd. (ZeI). The previous shareholders of the Anglo American
Mining Companies were issued ZeI loan stock in proportions to their origi-
nal holdings of the company·s shares.
The book value, indicated by the audited assets of the company at
31 December 1969 was used as the basis for the settlement. This book
value was $345 million, 51% of which amounted to $176 million and after
adding 3 months·s interest at 6% per annum, totalling $178 million. Payment
for the 51% interest in NCCM was effected by the issue of ZimeD bonds.
Zambian Industrial Mining Company (Zimeo) is wholly owned by the Government
and Zimeo in turn owns 100% of MINDECO ltd. The bond issue is repayable
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with interest at 6% by twenty-four equal semi-annual installments beginning
October 1970 and terminating on April 1,1982. This means a semi-annual
payment of $1005 million.
The Government therefore acquired 51% of Zambian Anglo American1s
operat'ing assets for $179 million repayable at 6% over 12 years.
The terms of financial compensation for RST were similar. The
operating assets of RST were amalgamated into one operating company; Roan
Consolidated Mines Limited (ReM). These assets were valued at $230 million
as at December 31, 1969,51% of which was $118 million with interest
repayment at 6% being in 16 semi-annual payments each of $9.5 million,
beginning October 10, 1970. The shareholders of RST therefore held 49%
shareholding in ROM and also received the compensation bond. Payment of
both sets of bonds are guaranteed by the Zambian Government. The amounts
are payable in U. S. dollars, and are free from any Zambian exchange control
restrictions (except for Rhodesian residents) and free from all present and
future taxes except those normally applied to residents in Zambia. The
bends are freely negotiable. In an explanatory note to its shareholders
(dated June 30, 1970) RST states lithe Bonds wi 11 enj oy an uncondi ti anal
guarantee of Zambia and the full faith and credit of Zambia will be pledged
for the due and punctual p~ent of the principal and interest on the bonds
and for the perfonnance of all obligations of Zimcowith respect thereto."
Consequently the redemption payments on the ZimeD Bonds need not depend on
the future profits of ROM and NCCM respectively. But given the Government~
dependence on Copper as a major foreign exchange earner (95% of the total
foreign exchange earnings) and the major source of Government revenue,
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clearly the payments can be met only if copper profits are adequate.
Consequently, the Government's ability to pay is directly linked to the pro-
fitability of RCM and NCCM. Certainly the Government expect3 to meet the
payments out of MINDECQ·s dividends.
As part of the fina~cial arrangements, an agreement was reached with
Zambia Governmentls Exchange Control Authority permitting RST and ZAA to
transfer outside Zambia certain non-mining assets. RST was authorized in
particular to transfer abroad $25 million but it had to give the undertaking
that to the extent that it was called upon to do so, it would reinvest or
contribute a maximum of $21 million towat-ds capital finance required by ReM
for the development of existing or opening of new mines. lAA was similarly
permitted to transfer abroad $40 million with the undertaking to reinvest
$16.8 million over a five-year period ending December 31, 1974. In addi-
tion both companies were allowed to transfer abroad their pension funds.
B. Management and Consultancy Contract
An essential part of the nationalization agreements were the manage-
ment contracts held by Anglo American (Central Africa) limited, and RST
Management Services Limited for the management of NCCM and ReM respectively.
Besides the management contracts which are valid for ten years from 1970 ..
1980 these foreign companies were granted sales, purchasing and recruiting
contracts.
For rendering these services (managerial, financial, commerc~al and
technical, etc.) RST will receive from ReM and AAC from NCCM fees of 3/4%
of gross sales proceeds plus 2% of profit after 51% mineral tax but before
deduction of 45% company tax. There is also an engineering service fee of
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3% with all costs reimbursed. Besides,RCM and NCCM will pay the salaries
and related allowances of all staff seconded from the two foreign parent
companies.
The sales and purchasing contracts carry commissions of: 3/4% of
gross sales proceeds of copper products and 2 1/2 of gross sales proceeds
of cobalt products, with no commission collectable on local sales. These
contracts may expire after two yearls prior written notice by either
party after 31 December 1979 or rescinded with two years' notice before
31 December 1979: (1) by the operating companies (ReM and NCCMI) if inter-
es ts of the forei gn pa rent campan; es (RST and AAC) fa 11 be low 20% or if
services rendered are not satisfactory. (2) by RST and AAC if their
advice is repeatedly rejected or not implemented by the Government (IIAII )
directors. Policy decisions would naturally be made by the boards of ReM
and NCCM but all major decisions, particularly those involving financing
and investment, must be approved by separate majorities of IIAII directors
(representing the Government) and USII directors (for the companies). It
is worth pointing out that the agreement also stipulates that the companies
must be operated so as to lIoptimi ze product; on and prof"i ts. II As contra-
dictory as this may seem, it is the type of compromise solution that comes
out of such negotiations and which may eventually become the source of
bitter argument.
Copies of the original agreements were not available to the autllors
at the time of writing but details of the agreements as they appear in
Bostock and Harveyls book, Economic Indeeendence in Zambian Copper, are
reproduced as Appendix II.
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The agreements signed with both ZAA and RST provided that the
following events constituted default:
1. Default for 30 days in the payment of principal or
interest due on the bonds and loan sto~k;
2. The sale of Zimco or ReM or NCCM of all or a substantial part
of assets;
3. The bankruptcy, liquidation or amalgamation of Zimeo, MINDECO,
RCM or NCCM or in the event of anyone entity entering into
arrangements prejudicial to bond as stock holders.
4. Unlawful cancellation or abrogation by RCM or NCCM of the
management and consultancy or sales and marketing contract;
5. Unlawful abrogation or breach by Government or Zimeo of its
obligations under the Master Agreement (e.g. undertakings in
respect of taxation and exchange control);
6. Material failure by ReM and NCCM to abide by any of the provi-
sions of their Articles of Association designed for the pro~
tection of the 118 11 shareholders (e.g. ignore the veto power
of B Directors, described in Appendix II).
7. Failure by ReM or NCCM to pay net profits on dividends to the
extent required by Articles of Association;
8. Unlawful cancellation or abrogation by the Zambian Government,
ZimcD, ReM, or NCCM of obligations to arbitrate disputes in
the manner described under the section deali~g with arbitra-
tion of disputes.
The agreement also stipulated that if two-thirds of the MINDECO
dividends fram ReM or NCCM exceeded the annual bond redemption payments of
$19.0 million and $21.1 million respectively, the excess would be applied
to additional redemption of the bonds. These accelerated payments could
shorten the period of repayment, but they would not reduce the obligation
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to make the same semi-annual payments in future years until the bonds and
loan stock were completely redeemed. Curiously enough there was no dece-
leration clause in the agreement; more will be said about this point later.
Breach of these agree~.,ents, i ncl udi ng the management contracts,
would render all the outstanding ZimeD bonds due and in'Inediately payable.
In fact, Zambia could not possibly pay in one installment the huge amounts
involved unless the balance had been diminished considerably. In reality
the only weapon the creditors m;g~t have would be to take the dispute to
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
with maximum publicity in the hope of generating enough pressure on Zambia.
The Government would probably accept any ICSID ruling so as to retain its
standing with other creditors and potential creditors.
This series of agreements has placed co~siderable restrictions on
the Government since management can block any undertaking outside the
nannal operations of the mining companies. Furthennore" investments for
which loans on normal commerical terms cannot be found can also be vetoed.
The Government obligations include an agreement not to rais o the
present level of taxation for mining operations and not to change the
exchange control regulations. These are onerous restrictions on the normal
freedom of action of the Government but with a tax rate of 73% and a
Government share of 51% of dividends there is little scope for increasing
taxation.
Otner Government undertakings were to apply, to all matters affecting
the mining campan1es,Zamb1an law as of December 31, 1969 and the new legis-
lation enacted to incorporate the takeover agreements themselves regardless
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of any subsequent changes in the law.
The nationalization package was apparently negotiated in a friendly
and cooperative spirit, and officials of both companies and Government have
indicated that the agreements, including the compensation for the proper-
ties, are fair. It should be noted in passing that there is a body of
opinion, both inside Zambia and elsewhere, that believes that the settle-
ment was overgenerous.
The Government accepted these re~trictions because it was most
anxious to reach an amicable settlement with the companies for the
following reasons:
1. It recognized its inability to operate the mines without foreigl
management and skills and without a large number of expatriate
staff for many years.
2. The Government could not afford the loss of revenue that might
have accompanied a production stoppage following a breakdown
of negotiations.
3. Government was very anxious to maintain its international cre-
dit standing, which would have been seriously jeopardized by an
allegation by the companies of expropriation without fair
compensation.
The peculiarly strong position enjoyed by the mining companies with-
in the overall economy of Zambia accounts in part for the IIgood" treatment
they received. Table 2 indicates quite clearly how important the copper
1ndustry is to the entire national economy.
Any country dependent as 15 Zamb1 a upon one ,··esource and indus try,
could not afford to risk the possible disruption that would probably have
followed a breakdown in negotiations or a total takeover of the industry.
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Consequent ly the m; ni ng cOOlpan; es had to be treated '/i·~ th cauti on.
It cannot be over emphasized that it is the bargaining powers of the
two parties in such negotiations that ultimately dictates the settlement.
These powers, real or perceived, may shift over a pel'iod of time and may
lead to subsequent renegotiat;ons~ cancellation of previous settlements or
total expropriation, e.g. the Chile copper nationalizations. It is well
and good for the mining conlpanies to come out of the 1969 negotiation with
water tight agreement and all the safeguards and guarantees entailed
therein. What happens subsequently may be another matter.
In fact, the agreements concluded do contain a good deal of
ammunition for a political radical or potential challenger of President
Kaunda. One thing is certain; when it comes to the showdown, the issue will
not be settled by legal niceties but by political pO'ller and exercise of
sovereign national rights. We need not go far for an example; the dubious
Clause 18, which the powerful mining companies managed to have inserted in
the Constitution at the time of Independence in 1964, to prevent reversion
of mineral rights to the Independent Zambian Government, had a short life
of five years even though a national referendum w~s required to amend it
in 1969.
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Chapter 5
STRUCTURE OF MINING INDUSTRY
Following the takeover on January 1, 1970, the structu)~e of the
Zambian mining industry is as follows:
RCM (Formerly RST)
The Governments 51% share in ReM ;s held and administered by the
Mining Development Corporation, Limited (MINDECO), a new holding company and
a subsidiary of the Zambian Industrial and Mining Corporation Limited (ZIMeD).
The original RST was reorganized as RST International and is now a
wholly owned subsidiary of the U. S. American Metal Climax (AMAX). RST In-
ternational holds a 20% share in RCM. The other major shareholder is an affi-
liate of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, with a holding of
12.25%; the remaining 16.75% share in RCM is held by private sharesholders,
mainly American. The mines owned and managed by ReM are Mufulira, Luanshya,
Ch1lbuluma, Chambishi and Ka1engwa mines, as well as the Ndola Copper
Refinery.
NCCM (Formerly AAC)
Here again the Zambian Governmentls 51% interest in NCCM is adminis-
tered by MINDECO. AAC reorganized and changed its domicile to Bermuda. Two
new companies were set up. (a) Zambian Copper Investments (ZeI) Incorporated
in Bermuda, holding Anglo American Interests (49%) in NCCM and interests in
other prospecting companies; and (b) Zamanglo Industrial Corporation (ZAMIC),
Incorporated in Zambia. holding AAC·s industrial interests. The new company
NCCM owns and operates Nchanga. Rhokana. Bancroft Bwana Mkubwa and Nampundwe
Mines as well as the Rhokana Copper Refinery. (See Table 3).
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Role of MINOEeD
MINDECO completes the pattern of governmental control over industry
and commerce in Zambia. The- control introduced in 1968, with INDEeD taking
a 51 % share in 27 p~',i vate compani es, has now been campl imented by the crea-
tion of MINDECO for mining industry and FINDECO for the banking and
insurance industry. But, as a controlling influence clearly MINDECO has the
greater potential from an economic and social point of view.
With offices in the new ZimeD building on the main street of Lusaka,
close to the hea.~ offi ces of Me and RCM, MINDECO plays 1i ttl e more than an
advisory and audit role with a staff of about fifteen Zambians and expa-
triates. Clearly such a holding company should be responsible for general
direction of its subsidiarie5, while at the same time acting as the cus-
todian of the governmentls copper mining interests. Since nationalization,
it has restricted itself to inquiry in two major areas - marketing and
rationalization - with differing effectiveness.
MINDECO has taken a keen interest in copper pricing and sales and has
established an office in London in order to keep close touch with the London
Metal Erchange (LME). Whereas there are no obvious differences between MIN-
DECO and the foreign companies regarding pricing policies, MINDECO has sug-
gested that there should be more rigorous marketing of copper, the feeling
being that in the past copper was placed and not marketed. Although this
may be true, it is not clear what effect MINDECO can have on world copper
prices, now was it certain that it had anything concrete planned. Histori-
cally, the pricing of copper has fluctuated widely, largely due to the margi-
nal nature of the LME, and their interest in the marketing of copper is
not surprising when it is realized that such fluctuations make economic
planning impossible. In 1964, under a scheme proposed by Sir Roland Prain.
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Chairman of RST. the two Zambian Mining groups sold their copper on a basis
of IIfixed producer price," which \~as adjusted periodically. The purpose
of the scheme was ostensibly to stabilize the market for copper and to
reduce the threat of substitution by other materials. It was perhaps wish-
ful thinking to expect that the Zambian producers by themselves could have
achieved such a monumental feat. The net result of this ill-conceived
scheme was the loss of substantial revenues and profits for the Government
and producers alike. When the scheme was abandoned in April 1966 the LME
price and Chilean price were over $1680 per ton while the Zambian prices,
depending upon the grade of Copper, were down to about $790.
Four months after Zambials reversion to LME pricing, however, the
LME price itself fell by about $600 per ton, reflecting in part the sudden
increase in supply of copper when AAC released its stock piles of the
previous two years and RST, which had cut down production during the same
period, expanded its output.
Surprisingly there was no pressure from the Government on the mining
companies to sell copper at prevailing world prices, perhaps due to lack
of experience and ignorance an the part of the government officials con-
cerned with copper production and marketing. During this period however
the royalties payable to the Government were calculated on the LME price.
As stated in the 1971 Executive Chairman1s statements the london
office of MINDECO was opened with a view to establishing and maintaining
links with the international min1ng community. The main theme of this
activity 1s undoubtedly on the marketing front l although its effectiveness
can be questioned. In 1965 Chile, peru, Zaire and Zambia created the Inter-
governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC). a clear para-
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llel to the highly successful Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). CIPEC has the reputation of having built up a highly competent
secretariat, but the objectives of the member states are unlikely to be as
clear cut as those of OPEC, largely because of the political importance of
labor intensive copper extraction within their economies. Where OPEC can
control oil supply by turning a valve at an oilfield, a CIPEC country must
consider the more drastic effects of p~oduction cut-backs. Equally the dis-
persion of copper deposits throughout the world is contrasted with the
concentration of oil in regions in North Africa and the Middle East which
share similar political aspirations. As well as this, production costs
vary considerably from one mine to another within the CIPEC group, so that
control of output can affect the profitability of the mines of member
nations in varying degrees. Finally, CIPEC will find it harder to organize
against major buyers because of the all-important secondary markets in
scrap copper. Discussions with commodity consultants predicted little
success for CIPEC until perhaps Canada and Australia were persuaded to join
the organization. Meanwhile the price of copper will continue to reflect
the relationship of the current over-capacity in producing countries fol-
lowing the downtown in world economic activity in 1970 and 1971, a situation
which may well continue until 1973: or 1974 unless some major unpredictable
factor occurs.
The MINDECO managem~nt is also looking into the question of closer
co-ordination and future integration of NCCM and ROM in order to achieve
rationalization and possible economies. So far the two mining companies
operate almost independently with little coordination. Before the takeover
AST und AAC ran completely separate operations, although some managers
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admit that there ar~e opportunities for economies of scale especially in
refining operations, computer services, and purchasing.
Given the nature of the management contracts signed with the two
foreign mining companies, it is doubtful that MINDECO can press for
rationalization without abrogating some of the terms of these contracts.
The two mining companies can be expected to cooperate with MINDECO in any
effort to achieve economies of scale provided these efforts do not curtail
their rights or freedom of action under the management contracts.
The centralization MINDECO is now striving to achieve might have
been established at the time of the takeover by simply offering one
management contract to either RST or AAC to run the mines belonging to both
groups. This probably would have entailed higher cOiilpensation for the
company that was deni ed the rnanagement contract since th i s was in integra1
part of both settlements. It is not clear to what extent this possibility
was explored at the time of the takeover but, having decided to keep both
AAC and RST involved, MINDECO must now find a formula to persuade the
mining companies not only to cooperate with it, but to coordinate activi-
ties be1)/een themselves.
'"he companies feel that one of the greatest benefi ts to be derived
from partnership with a Government is in the area of staff and labor rela-
tions, s'ince the Government and companies now find common cause in attempt-
ing to control wage demands or secure qualified staff to main technical and
managerial posts.
These expectations of the companies have not been entirely met. The
companies, which stili depend largely on expatriates for technica1 and
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managerial staff, assert that conditions of employment offered by Zambia
are no longer competitive by world market standards and that they are
finding it increasingly difficult to recruit. They had hoped that MINDECO,
which shares the companies· concern in such matters will tr.y to obtain some
relaxation of Government controls on expatriate salaries and allowances.
Salary increases for expatriate staff are unpopular, politically and social-
ly, and MINDECO is not anxi ous to take on such a sens i ti ve issue. -fhe
MINDECO management has also avoided labor relations issues~ maintaining
tha t these prob 1ems properly belong wi th the operati ng campan i ~s. MINDECO·s
long-term policies on these issues will inevitably reflect the Government
line and this is not yet known. The Government must now decide what line
to take on labor questions now that it is a direct party (on the manage-
ment side) to any dispute, while still drawing much of its political
support from the copper belt workers.
At this stage it is worth reminding ourselves of the objectives of
the government partners in such a joint venture. Friedman suggested6 that
there might be areas of the economY in which the government felt that it
should be in direct control, but that complete political control might be
unwise since the enterprise would still need to be run on commercial rather
than state-nationalized lines. When first incorporated! the MINDECO board
reported through its chairman and managing director to the ZimeD board,
the holding company board which was chaired by President Kaunda himself and
on which the Minister of Mines sat as an ex efficio member. This was a
two-edged benef1t, for the companies hoped that the MINDECO Chairman could
use his position on the limeo board to obtain the ear of the President on
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their behalf, while having the same status as the Minister of M'ines) who
was of course politically responsible for all mining operations; but at the
same time this made the political profile of the MINDECO Chairman very
high, something which was not his personal taste and which made it more
diffi~ult for him to remai~ uncompromised in his efforts to create the
right environment for the corr"nercial operation of the mines.
But this structure was not to survive. While being careful not to
be drawn into a socia-political discussion of the strength and weaknesses
of President Kaunda himself, it is important to recognize the significance
of the great shortage of really able Zambians on whom he can call for
political and administrative office, and the relatively delicate balance
of power he must maintain in a country in which tribal differences are
still strong. Any official might be able to build up a significant power
base when there are so few of his compatriates to act as checks and
balances to his ambition, and it is noticeable that few major officers in
government or administration have held their posts for long, but have been
moved to control some completely different ministry or department. It
might be a mistake to read too much into this t especially since one way of
using such scarce management resources would be to shuffle them around in
the hope that short doses of competence would bolster up areas of weakness.
But it was a significant move when President Kaunda effectively emasculated
the Zimeo holding board as a policy-making cabinet, making the Minister of
Mines chairman of MINDECO, and allowing the chairman and managing director
to drop back a little from the political limelight when he simply retained
the post of managing director.
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The implications of the move can be taken many ways. Another MINDEOD
director was approving in that the managing director would now be less
likely to be moved himself as part of a political reshuffle - a move which
Zambians and expatriates alike would view with apprehension since he has
shown great competence and tact throughout his dealings with the mining
companies. Equally the mining companies now see that their lobby to the
President has been weakened at a time when low copper prices, rising costs
and a competitive labor market internationally are presenting them with
many more semi-political problems.
Thus it can be seen that the political temperature in Zambia is
still most important to the mining companies, even if their political pro-
file has been reduced by the nationalization. The fears of professional
management - that day to day decision processes should become completely
politically constrained - is a real problem. It was made clear that one of
the greatest impacts of the nationalization had been the increased efforts
necessary on the part of senior corporate management to keep MINDECO offi-
cials informed of all decisions which could conceivably contain political
implications.
The issue of MINDECO·s management and technical competence suggests
an important area of inconsistency in the perceived objectives of the
mining management of AAC and RST and MINDECO itself. The management con-
tracts, as negotiated in 1969, both terminate in 1980. It was therefore
an obvious line of inquiry to ask the parties what relationship they pre-
dicted for 1981. Replies ranged from a statement that no-one could look
that far ahead in Zambia in 1972, to a long discussion of the need for
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continuity of management. Perhaps surprisingly the first opinion was
heard from a mining company official in London, and the second from a
MINDECO official in Lusaka.
Later discussions of the Zambianization process will imply that,
whatever the performance to date, unless enough Zambians prepare themselves
for technical and management positions in the mines by opting for suitable
training, instead of the usual liberal arts degrees at universities, there
will still be a significant need for expatriate skills in 1980. The debate
then changes to one of organizational structures. Clearly the status quo
might continue, with both AAC and RST receiving management contracts for a
further term. If this were to be so the ideal situation would be an early
statement to this effect from MINDECO so that the two companies can plan
their own resources accordingly. But such a declaration of intent is pro-
bably impossible in the current political climate. It may well be that
informal discussions have already taken place. Certainly MINDECO was aware
of the problem and its political risks, but no sign of any clear policy was
available. The alternatives are limited, but provide problems of their
own. MINDECO could elect to take over the management of the mines entirely
in 1980, offering employment or expatriate contracts to the employees of
AAC and RST as they needed them. Problem areas here might be that a govern-
ment corporation could find difficulty in justifying in political and social
terms the maintenance of high salaries for qualified expatriate staff, and
also there might be fears on the part of some of the expatriates who could
see continuity of employment within AAC or RST as assured, but who would be
less happy about working for the Zambian government. At the same time,
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international monetary sources have usually taken an interest in the record
and motivation of the management contract holders when considering new
investments, and perhaps AAC and RST have a different credit rating from
that of MINDECO. Finally MINOECO might take its existing rationalization
program to its logical conclusion and request the two existing management
teams to merge, thus retaining the benefit of their skills and considerable
experience~ while at the same time being able to show changes in the
structure as a political sweetener, since extension of any management con-
trol agreement is certain to incur criticism.
Discussions with MINDECO officials suggested that they were thought-
ful not only of their own competence, but also of their impact on the
management of the mining companies. They appreciated their own problems in
acquiring and keeping good Zambian staff when MINDECO was committed to what
they described as no more than a· consulative and overseeing role. Equally
they could not imagine the possibility of building up the MINDECO staff to
anything like the capability required to run the mines outright by 1980.
The redundancy of manpower would be prohibitive, especially in a country
where there were such shortages. This redundancy had already been commented
on by mine officers, and by corporate staffs in London who had questioned
the relevance of a London office for MINDECO.
It still seemed, however, that the consensus of opinion was that
MINDECO would, at least ostensibly, take over the management of the mines
in 1980. Some signs were found in discussions with the companies that,
as optimists, they should assist this process as far as possible by
encouraging rationalization plans so that hasty action could not damage the
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performance of the mines thereafter - their optimism being the assumption
that they would still own a 49% interest in the mines. In general these
attempts at cooperation seemed reasonable, and there was no evidence of any
action directly obstructive to the desires of MINDECO. But then there was
no evidence either of the kind of petty shows of force which a certain
Inajor oi 1 company cl aimed to have encountered wi th one of the other govern-
ment holding companies, where both auditors and lawyers had been changed
by the 51% interest - not to Zambian firms, as might be expected, but to
other international firms in London. Thus the working relationship seemed
extremely mature, something mentioned gratefully by the management of both
AAC and RST, who thus seem prepared to respond to the suggestions and
tactful inquiries of MINDECO.
65
Chapter 6
POINTS OF CONFLICT
The partnership is now firmly established and there is almost complete
harmony between Government ·officials in MINDECO and the expatriate officials
operating ReM and NCCM. It would be ideal if such relationships were main··
tained, and 1970-1972 does not become recorded as honeymoon period followed
by serious disagreements and possibly a total break. It would perhaps be a
fair guess to suggest that the cordiality is likely to persist as long as
there is no substantial change in or a threat to the present political
leadership of Zambia. Besides the political climate, however, there are
areas of conflict which if not carefully handled could pose a serious threat
to the future of the partnership. These areas of conflict are:
1. Zambianization
2. Industrial Relations
3. Production
4. Compensation
5. CC'ntrol
Zambianization:
This is a sensitive issue and has been so for many years. It first
became a public issue in 1940 when the Northern Rhodesian Regiment opened
fire on rioting crowds, killing nineteen African workers during disturbances
in the copper belt. Following the disturbances, a commission of inquiry was
set up under the chairmanship of Sir John Forster Q. C., to look into the
causes of the rioting and the killings. The commission, though not required
by its terms of reference to consider IIAfrican advancement," did so at some
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length in a section of the report dealing with IIracial difficulties. 1I The
issue raised ;n 1940 by the phrase IIAfrican advancement" was whether
Africans employed in the mining industry would be given the opportunity to
undertake, wi thout rega rd to the; r rae; alor; gi n, work for VJhi ch they wer"e
fitted by inherent ability or acquired skill. The farsighted recommenda-
tion of the Forster Commission on this point was summarized in these words~17
The mine managements should consider with represen-
tatives of the Government and the Northern Rhodesian Mine
Workers Un;o~ to what positions now now open to him the
African worker should be encouraged to advance.
The reaction of the Northern Rhodesian Government to this recommenda-
tion was somewhat negative and the companies and the union ignored the
recOfTITIendati on. A'l, the end of the war the compani es and the Northern
Rhodesia Mine Workers Union concluded an agreement that was to retard the
advancement of African Workers.
The Company agrees that work of the class or grade that
is being performed or job that is being filled by an employee
at the time of the'signing of the agreement shall not be
given to persons to whom the terms and conditions of this
agreement do not apply.18
This provided a legal basis or recognition for a color bar which
existed on the mines in the copper belt, reserving all jobs with any
meaningful content for the Europeans. This situation persisted despite the
findings of subsequent commissions of inquiry, which deplored this state
of affairs. In 1954 a Board of Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Forster
*The Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers Union was fornled in 1936 to
represent the interests of the daily-paid European workers in industry.
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ruled:
It has been agreed by all parties in the inquiry, and
we accept the view, that the African in the copper mining
industry is capable of industrial advancement and that he
has not yet been permitted to advance to the full extent
of his capabilities.
However, it was not until 1955, fifteen years after the issue had
first been raised and ten years after World War II, that the first steps
were taken by the industry in the area of African advancement. In that
year the RST group of companies reached a compromise with the European
Union. Under this settlement the union agreed to release from schedule
II All (which was the name given to the list of those jobs up to that time
solely represented by the European Union) certain jobs of low skill
content, together with certain lIidentical or ragged edge ll jobs previously
performed by Africans in some mines and by Europeans in others.
In 1962 as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland came to an end
and Zambia began to prepare for Independence. the achievements in the field
of African advancement at that time can te summarized as follows:
1. All jobs in the industry were open to Africans and some
Africans had already passed into schedule IIA II employment.
2. A group of intermediate jobs had been created to bridge the
gap between the old African wage structure and schedule II All ,
the predominantly European field of employment.
3. The first steps had been taken to create a unified wage
structure.
The end of the Federation and the approach of Independence for
Zambia forced the companies to undertake a critical and major review of
their employment policies. The mining companies recognized the need for
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change and began to evolve new policies during 1962-1963. The objectives
of these new policies were:
1. To reorganize the manning structure of the mines so that there
was no obstacle to rapid Zambianization. This involved a vast
increase in the fragmentation and modification of jobs so that
a well-ordered hierarchy was produced.
2. To establish a permanent local wage structure, incorporating
the nB-I jobs, responsive to local economic f"actors rather than
ties to a temporary European wage structure which had been
conditioned by the economic environment of more highly
developed countries.
3. To recogni ze the temporary nature of the European I 5 emp1oy~nent
on the mines, in the light of the policy of Zambianization, and
so to establish for him the status of an expatriate who would
supply skills and experience only for so long as these could not
be provided locally. As the Europeans had been encouraged to
regard themselves as permanent IIsettlers ll during the Federal era,
this represented a major change in status and involved a number
of steps. The first was to transfer daily rated Europeans to
staff positions. This move helped reduce their growing feeling
of insecurity at a tinle of rapid political change and also made
training and supervision of Zambians a normal part of the
expatriatels job. Next their conditions of service were adjus-
ted so as to provide for a displacement formula to be applied
when an expatriate had to make way for a Zambian who had been
trained to replace him. Finally, the establishment of
expatriate status for Europeans was introduced, i.e. they were
given fixed period contracts.
4. To develop a comprehensive and relatively long term programme
of Zambianization to meet as quickly as possible aspirations of
Zambians consistent with the maintenance of production standards
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and safety margins. And, to institute new and comprehensive
training programs. 19
The next major event in employment conditions for Africans came in
1966 when the nonindependent Government of Zambia appointed a commission of
inquiry under the chairmanship of Judge Brown to look into the wage struc-
ture and other conditions of service of the mining industry.18
The terms of reference required the commission to:
1. Inquire into the conditions of service, including wages,
housing~ leave and social facilities, of employees in
the mining industry serving on local conditions of
employment evolved by the mining companies whether
through negotiations with employee organizations or
otherwise.
2. Inquire into the disparity which exists between the
conditions of service, including the aforesaid matters,
of employees in the mining industry serving on expatriate
conditions of employment and employees in the mining in-
dustry serving on local conditions of employment.
3. Determine whether the disparity referred to in paragraph
two hereof should be eliminated or reduced having regard
to the national interest; to the consequences, whether
financial, economic, social or otherwise, which would
result from such elimination or reduction; and to the
improvement in industrial relations which might be ex-
pected to follow from such elimination or reduction.
The commission found that the existence of the dual wage structure
was not justified and therefore recommended the establishment of single
basic scale for all employees of the industry with the stipulation that
expatriate staff be paid, in addition, certain inducement and related
allowances. As a direct result of the commissionls findings and in order
to bridge the gap between the two scales, the African workers were awarded
22% increase in 1966.
One other outcome of these findings was the formation of a Zambian-
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ization committee in 1966 to oversee the training and advancement of
Zambians in the copper industry. The composition of the committee is as
follows:
Minister of State for the Cabinet and Public Service - Chairman
Minister of State for Technical Education
Secretary to the Cabinet
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Mines
Staff Development Adviser, Cabinet Office
Director of Civil Service Training
A representative of the Anglo-American Group of Companies
A representative of the Roan Selection Trust Group of Companies
President, Zambia Mineworkers Union
General Secretary, Zambian Mineworkers Union
Chairman, Zambia Expatriate Mineworkers Association
The mining companies have achieved a good deal of success with their
Zambianization program since independence. They have had to contend, how-
ever, with one major constraint - availability of local manpower. In spite
of the enormous expansion of education and training in the 1960·5, the
number of educated Zambians at the end of the decade was still too small to
reduce very significantly the chronic dependence on non-Zambians over al-
most the whole range of the country·s most skilled and influential occupa-
tions. (See Table 4)
Table 5 puts these figures in perspective, by comparing them with
other countries in West, East and Central Africa. With the exception of
Botswana, Zambia in recent years has beer. far more dependent on expatriate
manpower than Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria or Sudan. The contrasts between
Zambia and the other countries exist at all levels, from graduate to middle
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and secondary school. Even though the Zambian data refers to a later
period than for most of the other countries, Zambia had at all educational
levels far less local manpower than Nigeria and the Sudan a~d at all
education levels except graduates much less than Tanzania and Kenya.
Since Independence education has been massively expanded to provide
the long run solution to this chronic scarcity of skilled and educated
citizens. The University of Zambia was founded in 1966 and by 1970 had
over 1200 students enrolled and several hundred more were studying in
universities abroad. Secondary school enrollments reached 50,000 in 1970
compared with 7,000 in 1963. A Commission for Technical Education was also
started in 1968 headed by a Minister of State and given responsibility and
considerable funds for all forms Of technical education and training.
The mining companies are also undertaking considerable training of
their staff and are now spending over $16 million a year on training. The
industry runs a training school for registered nurses as well as trade
training institutes which they operate on behalf of the Commission for
technical Education and Vocational Training. The new trade schools opened
in 1970 with 100 full-time students and this number was expected to exceed
150 by the end of 1971.
If only half of the efforts poured into education since independence
produces a reasonable return, Zambia will be well on the way to solving its
problems of skills shortages by the end of the 1970's, In the meantime
the mining campanies are expected to show good faith through rapid Zambian-
1zlt1on. in an atmosphere that is traditionally distrustful and suspicious.
It hiS blln SUIllstld thlt the taklover should hive blln used as an
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occasion for a formal deal on localization. An agreement on this issue
would have committed the companies to a timetable but would also have
required the Government to guarantee an adequate number of scmol leavers and
technical college and University graduates to make the scheme feasible.
The current arrangements require the mining compan~es to submit a
five-year schedule of Zambianization to the Zambianization committee for
review and approval. The schedules should show the progress of Zambiani-
zation to date and the Zambianization program for the subsequent five year
period. A summary of one of these forecasts is reproduced in Table 60
In the most recent Zambianization schedule 20 covering the period
1970-1975, the section dealing with Technological and Technical reads:
This category includes mining engineers, mechanical and
electrical engineers, metallurgists, geologists, chemists,
operational research scientists, doctors, and qualified
medi ca 1 staff.
At the end of 1970 the industry had 12 Zambian techni-
cal graduates. This number should increase to 90 at the
end of 1975 if all those now at universities complete
their courses and return to the mines. The number of staff
now employed at graduate or equivalent level is approxi-
mately 1,200 and if the mines are to maintain the present
standard of efficiency, then the Zambianization of staff at
this level must only take place on a lI one for oneil basis as
Zambians with technical training and experience take over
from expatriates.
In face of Zambia's critical manpower shortage. this may be an honest
and realistic expectation but to suspicious Zambians this may appear as a
deliberate attempt to sabotage Zemb1an1zat1on. The rapid progress of
Zemb1an1ZIt1on made in 1960 is rather misleading because there was a good
dill of fragmentlt10n of jobs. It was not uncommon to divide among~t two
or three promoted 21mbfans I job previously done by one Europeln. An
Table 6
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE PROGRESS OF
ZAMBIANISATION ON THE MINES
(including Broken Hill and Ndola Copper Refineries)
Total No. of
Zambians in the
Total No. of Field of
Expatriates Expatriate Employment
*December, 1964 7 ,621 704
*March, 1966 6,592 1,138
*September, 1966 6,358 1,884
*October, 1967 5,671 2,617
*June, 1968 5 t 024 3,671
+ 1969 4,444 4,102December,
+ 1970 3,774 4,661December,
+ 1971 3,551 5,195December,
+ 1972 3, 168 5,578December,
*Actual Strengths.
+Forecast.
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extract from a company report summarizes the situation;
During the transitional period, generally the standard
of local shift boss is not as high as the expatriate he
replaced, largely due to lack of supervisory experience and
usually because of the difference in education. Therefore,
in some areas, it has been found necessary to reduce the
size of the sections supervised by local shift bosses and
increase supervision at Mine Captain and Assistant Under-
ground Manager level. It;s hoped that as local shift bosses
gain experience and confidence, they will be able to accept
additional responsibility and the levels of supervision can
again be reduced.
It was apparent throughout discussions that MINDECO appreciated the
problems of mine management under the Zambianization program. MINDECQ·s
primary responsibility is to produce copper; its secondary one is to pro-
duce that copper profitably, and finally to do so with the minimum employ-
ment of expatriates. That the companies might quarrel with the secondary
nature of profitability is clear, and this will be discussed later, but
there is a difficult trade-off for MINDECQ itself between production and
Zambianization. The responsibility carried by a mine captain 3,400 feet
below ground level was obvious even to the inexperienced observe.
With the history of Zambianization as laid out above, obviously one
must discount any statements as to the incompetence of Zambians to take
responsibility, but it ;s important to realize that safety standards are
crucial, and that MINDECO appreciates the risks. The major complaints
of the companies were not so much of any inherent disability in Zambians -
just that there were too few of them selecting mining as a career. There
was mention of a lack of ambition in Zambians who had taken the first steps
in promotion - perhaps to Shift Boss ~ but who seemed disinclined to take
further responsibility. Equally, it was suggested that the concept of
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industrial discipline was not natural to all Zambians: such discipline is
obviously essential when lives and equipment are at stake below and above
ground.
The companies have now reached a stage at which Zambianization of
staff must only take place on a lI one for oneil basis if efficiency is to be
maintained. The consequent slow down or perceived slow down of this process
can lead to serious conflicts between the foreign mining companies and the
local authorities.
The 1970-1975 Zambianization schedule, dealing with the underground
mining sector, for both NCCM and ReM is reproduced in Table 7. These
figures indicate that by the end of 1975 the most senior Zambians will be
mining eng~neers and that all the 70 senior posts (mine superintendents,
assistant mine superintendents t underground managers, and assistant
underground managers) will still be held by expatriates. The progress of
Zambianization in some of the non-technical areas has been much faster. The
Personnel Department is supposed to be completely Zambianized and there are
two Zambian Directors on the Board of NCCM.
Management of the companies were disturbed at the prospect of hand-
ling Zambianization in the near future. Their own experience of putting
Zambians in control of the personnel function in the early 60s did not
promise well for other management positions. A policy decision was taken
then that the "shadow" principle (which refers to the practice of an ex-
patriate assistant working under and alongside a Zambian manager) should not
be used. The result was that the most significant manpower functions were
split off leaving the responsibilities of the new Zambian manager limited.
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Initially this may have been reasonable, since at least the Zambian could
perform reasonably in the restricted area allowed to him. But his own
training and opportunity for advancement were reduced. Thus experience
suggests that it would be better to Zambianize managerial positions at
least initially with an expatriate assistant built into the structure,
allowing the Zambian to learn to handle all functions of the job. But such
a policy is probably politically impossible given the orientation of the
Zambianization Committee and the pressure groups represented within it.
An alternative was suggested by a mine executive - specifically that audit
of their Zambianization program might be the responsibility of MINDECO.
But on reflection it would seem that this would only increase the political
profile of Mindeco, which might be more disastrous in the long run. At
this stage it is difficult to see how this conflict can be resolved. There
is no doubt that in the political environment of the country there are
pressures to push Zambianization ahead faster than the productivity of the
mines could stand. Until the universities and Zambian Industry Training
boards produce enough qualified men, and until those men have obtained the
experience on the job necessary for real competence t this problem will be a
major headache for AAC, RST and MINDECO. The situation is, of course, more
emotive than any other, and the companies are always at risk to accusations
of maintaining Zambia's dependence on their technical skills. But if the
politicians need ammunition to force expropriation of the 49% interest at
some later stage, they could probably find good evidence. The defense
against them would be hard to argue - that Zambianization was progressing as
fast as possible given primary objectives of production and profit, and the
80
current importance of foreign earnings to the country. It is almost
impossible to make an estimate of the real dangers to production afforded
by faster Zambianization since no opinion could be entirely objective given
the conflicting aims of the parties involved. Suffice to say that where
Chile could rely on highly competent Chileans trained in mining for many
years, Zambia as yet cannot count that asset as fully mature.
Industrial Relations:
It has already been suggested that MINDECO is not prepared to take
up the case of the companies in national policy formation on industrial
relations. In fact the relationship between the mine management and the
unions is good - infinitely better than in the Federation days when inde-
pendence groups used the unions as a vehicle for action, and the companies
found themselves at the centre of a political battle in which strike action
was often used. Once independence came, however, President Kaunda
appreciated the importance of copper production to his own budgets, and
strike action often resulted in the ringleaders finding themselves in
prison.
But clearly AAC and RST must take note of national policies in their
wage negotiations since the demonstration effect of mine awards is consi-
derable, and to maintain good communications with MINDECO during wage
negotiations with unions obviously increases the risk of a leak of company
policies.
More significant problems may have been introduced by the 1971
Industrial Relations Act,aO and here also the companies were not successful
in persuading MINDECO to lobby in their behalf. In general the Act is
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thought well of by the Companies, but it introduces the concept of workers'
committees developed in Yugoslavia, a country which is joined to Zambid by
a strong friendship between Marshall Tito and President Kaunda.
Industrial relations executives in both companies were most disturbed
by the change. They feared that the concept would lead to fragmentation of
the unions since these are now largely unaffected by local party politics,
and if another faction begins to make representations in 'their capacity as
the workers· councils, the unions will probably become involved in local
political struggles. It seemed to them to introduce too much democracy
into an industrial relations environment which is already trying to over-
come the deterioration in productivity since independence. Once again,
one sees a conflict between short term management goals, and President
Kaunda1s efforts to build a sense of pride in the population of Zambia.
Production
One of the main economic reasons for the takeover was the dissatis-
faction with the rate of growth in Zambials copper output and productive
capacity. In an address delivered in November 1970 President Kaunda stated
that prior to the nationalization agreements the companies forecasted an
~ncrease in their production from 749,000 tons in 1969 to 793,000 tons by
1975. He then went on to say lIunder our control the expansion plans have
been revised and accelerated, and production is expected to reach 967,000
tons by 1975, an increase of nearly 200,000 tons. 1I A recent official
forecast for 1975 production is 900,000 tons - 500,000 for NCCM and 400,000
for ReM.
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It is important to question why the foreign mining companies agreed
to a higher level of investment to increase output by at least 100,000 tons
over the 1970-1975 period. Since changes in ownership, taxation, and
exchange control were all announced simultaneously it is virtually impos-
sible to identify the exact cause of the increase in projected expansion.
The previous tax structure consisted of a combination of royalties based on
value of output, an export tax and income tax. This tax system resulted in
high cost mines paying a higher percentage of their gross earnings in taxes
than did low cost mines. Both the royalty and the export tax were based on
production without regard to cost or net earnings, and this made it unpro-
fitable to mine certain ore bodies of low grade or difficult location.
So, whereas the President may argue that the projected higher rate of
output following takeover is a direct result of increased Government control
over the mining industry, it is important to realize that another major
factor could be the tax reform, which shifted the tax structure to a straight
percentage of net profits. Perhaps additional incentive for investment for
expansion, from the companies· point of view, was the increased cash flow
over the next 8 to 12 years as result of the nationalization agreement;
neither the compensation payments nor dividends are subject to exchange con-
trols.
To implement these expansion plans a considerable amount of external
financing is anticipated, and the burden for finding this financing will fall
mainly on the foreign companies. Both companies are able to use their
relatively unleveraged position to borrow funds for expansion, this being
necessary since the current low price of copper does not generate enough
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funds for bond redemption and expansion plans. A recent bond issue by NCCM
in London was not guaranteed by the Zambian Government - a letter of good
intent was all that was provided - but presumably the market has enough
confidence in copper prospects, given their low leverage position. Barring
a sharp fall in copper prices or a drastic change in Zambia1s investment
climate, the expectations are that the foreign companies would make a strong
effort to meet their 1975 production targets.
Failure to do so because of unwillingness to provide capital financ-
ing might generate adverse political reactions which could jeopardize the
arrangements unde~"' the nati anal i zati on agreement.
Compensation Paymen'ts
Copper prices are extremely volatile and 1970, the year of the Zam-
bian copper takeover, provides an excellent example: prices fell from a
high of $175. to a low of $1 ,040 per metric tonne.
There is no evid~nce to indicate the extent of discussion at the
negoti ati ons of the consequences of a seri ous fall in pri ce of copper a"d
an attendant deterioration of Zambials balance of payments, tax structure,
the level of Government revenue, and hence of Zambials ability to meet the
bond redemption payments. The absence of a payment deceleration clause in
the nationalization agreement has resulted in considerable discussion.
Taken together wi th "the hi gh ly favorab1e ~anagement contracts negoti ated by
the copper companies, it leads to the possible conclusion that the Zambian
bargaining team was not as able as had been thought originally. Certainly
the absence of a deceleration clause is significant if one takes the view
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that AAC and RST were already expecting a fall in copper prices when they
were asked to offer 51% ownership to the Zambian government. If this were
so, and it seems highly likely, the company negotiators would have been care-
ful to ensure that their own cash flows were assured whatever happened to
copper prices. Their strategy would seem to have been founded on the pre-
mise that a reduction of their holding to 49% would release considerable
funds which might be invested far more profitably outside Zambia during the
early seventies.
Expansion of the Zambian copper production was discussed in the
previous section. By the end of 1972 Chilean capacity is expected to be
increased 51% over its 1966 outputs, Peruvian by 143% and Canadian by 35%.
There are other major increases planned for Australia, Rhodesia and the
Republic of South Africa, besides the prospect that Mauritania and Botswana
may be exporting copper by 1973. Thus unless demand for copper begins to
exceed long term projections there is a strong likelihood of copper surplus
in the 1970's and subsequent weakening of copper prices.
The fear of world overproduction and of a lower price may have
accounted partially for the Zambian mining companies' hesitation to enlarge
their production capacity. The Government's position, however, is at the
other extreme; realizing that Zambia has diminishing influence on world
price, it is important from the Government's point of view that as new
deposits are opened up throughout the world, production should be increased
so as to minimize foreign exchange losses as prices fall.
Asharp drop in copper prices may not only find the partners at
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cross-purposes, but might also force the Government either to default on
the bond redemption payments or renegotiate the entire agreement.
Control
It is difficult for an outsider to believe that the two mining com-
panies are actually under majority Government ownership or have recently
changed ownership. True, the Government holds the majority control of the
two mining companies but at present that appears to be the extent of its
involvement. Due mainly to the Government's ignorance of the industry and
the need to give management a free hand to make profits, a considerable
amount of power has been awarded the management group the areas of mana-
. gerial control, financial planning and policy formulation. Thus, management
can reject investment that is not profitable,as well as any transactions that
are not on normal commercial terms,and any expansion into other fields of
business beside mining.
Once again, although there may not be a direct conflict between
MrNDECO and the mining companies on the question of control, the political
stability of the country becomes a major factor. Even if the companies
hoped to reduce their visibility by selling 51% to the government the pat-
tern has seemed to be that MINDECO appears determined to maintain a fairly
low profile. Practically, it is not possible for a transfer of shares to
make any difference to visibility when RCM and NCCM are still clearly
associated with RST and AAC through management contracts. Performance
under those contracts will always be judged politically in the light of the
past history of the foreign based management companies rather than as an
86
attribute of the nationally controlled mining companies. Thus, any issue
which results in open conflict could easily deteriorate into demands for
complete expropriation based on complaints that the 1969 negotiations were
inequitable in the light of current knowledge.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS
The previous chapters have described the historical aspects of the
1969 nationalization and the pressures which exist within the industry
today. In conclusion the authors will attempt to summarize the relative
successes and failures of partnership, and the prospects for the future.
It seems quite possible that the companies welcomed the 1969 devel-
opments. They were able to externalize $84 million frozen in Zambia since
the Mulungushi speech of 1968. They may well have foreseen the 1970 fall
in the price of copper following the mid-60's expansions in capacity
throughout the copper-producing world and opted to assure themselves of a
cash flow. Possibly the nationalization clarified the investment climate
in Zambia. Indeed it seems probable that the stock market had already
discounted a move of some sort. Reasonable compensation and a continued
presence in Zambia was believed much better than uncertainty which rendered
it difficult to implement investment plans. Finally the bond repayments
that the companies were able to negotiate, the unfreezing of blocked funds
already mentioned above and promises of unrestricted remittance of dividends
and contract fees released considerable resources for investment elsewhere.
The companies also expected help from their partners in two areas, liason
with government departments and in industrial relations. The former has
been shown to be a vain hope, as MINDECO treads the delicate balance between
an active lobby on their behalf and maintaining as low a political profile
as possible. On the latter front the proposed of worker's council might
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complicate relations ben/een the companies and the unions.
The Zamb; an Government on the other hand expected much of the pa rt-
nership: speedy Zambianization of staff; increased investment - the total
cost of the expansion program for NCCM alone is estimated at $280 million;
increased output by an additional 150,000 tons over 1970-1975; and finally,
control over the direction and rate of development of the mining industry.
Expansion of facilities was also an objective of the new taxation
and licensing regulations introduced as part of the negotiations whereby the
companies had to give up many of their exploration concessions. But it has
been suggested that the hi gh taxati on rate, whi ch follows a three~·year tax
haven, coupled with the 51% government option in successful exploration,
makes only the highest grade deposits economically viable. Thus new mining
facilities are unlikely to come on stream, especially as Zambia is fast
losing its reputation for being a low cost producer due mainly to the
enormous increases in fuel and transportation costs since U.D~I.
The result of the negotiations was a joint venture with a government
partner,but success or failure cannot really be measured within 24 months
of the fonnation of that partnership. It is worth reviewing, however, the
implicit objectives of the association: as of the end of December, 1971
production levels have not increased to anything approaching the expecta-
tions of the Government, even allowing for the disaster at Mufulira in late
1970. Output levels for 1971 when announced will probably be almost 20%
below forecast. Already so far behind schedule, Zambia is unlikely to reach
the estimated 900,000 ton level in 1975, the level forecast by the companies
in 1970. fa1lure by the companies to meet their 1975 investment plans and
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forecast output levels might introduce the serious strains in the associa-
ti on. Si nee the perfonnance of the compani es is man; tared cons tantly th is
friction might occur well before 1975 if the Gover'nment were to find their
efforts in meeting their targets sluggish or inadequate.
'For some time now, the Zamb; an Government has been concerned about
its almost total dependence on copper. In the second national development
plan, currently under implementation, economic diversification and
mechanization of agriculture are stressed. Zambia has also made and is
making huge investments in the development of infra-structure; for example,
The Tanzam Railway at an estimated cost of $400 million, (to be shared with
the Republic of Tanzania). At the same time the import-bill must be met;
since 1964 this has grown from $218 million to $500 nlillion per year - an
increase of 129 percent. This is an economic package that demands large
infusion of capital and real resources. It would therefore be difficult
for Zambia to maintain such level of economic activity and meet the bond
redemption payments should copper prices fall.
Such acquisitions by a Government are not only politically delicate
but can evoke serious economic objections. As Hirschman puts it:
from the economic point of view, the use of any capital
and, worse, foreign exchange resources for the purchase of
property rights over assets already located and functioning
within the territories of the developing countries seems
perverse to those who remain basically convinced that the
pace of economic development is conditioned on little else
than the availability of capital and foreign exchange23
Political motives apart the Zambian Government could conceivably have
attained control over the development and direction of the mining industry
through effective manipulation of physical, monetary, fiscal and exchange
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controls. Such control may have been preferable if one considers the fact
that the change in the structure of ownership has not in itself increased
real government control over the mining industry.
The authors agree with Seguin who questions the extent to which
majority ownership ensures real control of a joint venture and ay'gues that
there are many other constituents of control which may specifically deny
the power usually associated with holding a majority of the shares in an
enterprise. Under the current arrangements the Zambian government has been
denied such power. Assuming that real control was one of the main reasons
why the Government paid nearly $300 million for majority ownership of the
mining companies, then the Zambian authorities could be expected to make a
move (at some stage) to correct this imbalance. In the meantime the com-
panies must continue to review their position not only with respect to the
working of the agreements but also considering the original intent behind
the act of nationalization. It may well be that to avoid a clash over the
issue of control AAC and RST may well decide not to exercise their restric-
tive rights under the nationalization agreements.
Thus it follows that the joint venture seems unlikely to live up to
its potential. Rather it may well lead to a somewhat strained relationship
arising out of the political necessity for the government to own 51 percent
of the industry and the economic and technical necessity for real control
to remain with the operating companies. In the light of history, both in
Zambia and in Chile, it is quite understandable why the particular arrange-
ment was adopted,but in hindsight it is worth considering whether the govem-
ment could not have induced increased expansion and Zambianization by more
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subtle pressures, in which case the foreign exchange outflows in the
seventies need not have been so high. What economic programs might have
been introduced since nationalization by utilizing the $59 million which
have already left the country as compensation payments for other purposes
is not the subject of this paper. Agriculture is one sector which demands
attention; any increase in agricultural productivity would have a twofold
benefit; as well as reducing the dependence on copper it would begin to
affect those areas of the country where the largest and poorest section of
the population lives. Suffice to say that this is an area for development
which could suff~r if earnings from copper drop over the next few years.
The government must somehow reconcile its general responsibility for
developing the economy with its stake in the mining industry.
The future clearly holds considerable uncertainty for the mining
companies. As Mikesell explains, contracts of the nature of those nego~
tiated in 1969 have little meaning if the government partner should decide
to renegotiate. Whatever their standing in international law before the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, if the
bargaining position of either side should change considerably, it can be
expected that some form of renegotiation might take place. Thus the
absence of a deceleration clause, criticized in most accounts of the
negotiat1ons,might well not be the asset which the mining companies perceive
it to be. If the industry was hit by a large drop in price, the political
position might change so drastically in Zambia that renegotiation was the
only possibility.
The position both sides might take 1n 1980 when the management
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sales and purchasing contracts terminate, depends on a variety of factors
discussed in those sections dealing with the structure of the industry and
the role of MINDECO. The companies have to operate from the position that
they cannot get qualified Zambians to manage all aspects of their operations
but at the same time their progress towards Zambianization is monitored
regularly and is held to be a measure of how well they intend to cooperate
with government objectives. Meanwhile their 49% minority must be protected
as far as adequate profitability is concerned. Unless there is some major
political change in Zambia or a serious friction between the partners, it
seems likely that the 49% will not be expropriated before 1980 and after
that date it may still survive as a foreign shareholding with perhaps
reduced participation on the management contract front. Certainly the
Zambians will need some help to run the mines, and in many ways the bargain-
ing positions of the two sides will not have changed violently in 1980 from
their relationship in 1969. Obviously Zambianization will have progressed
by then, but still many top positions will be filled by expatriates if the
performance of the mines is to be maintained.
International joint business ventures involve much more than mere
financial partnership and perhaps much more important is the technical and ru-
man cooperation between countries and peoples with different traditions and
aspirations; consequently, the authors have emphasized the managerial and
human aspects of the partnership. It is an association which demands an
unusual amount of good faith and a clear understanding of each of the
partners· ultimate goals. Such congruence is difficult to achieve even
within one culture and international joint ventures by their nature
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tend to generate misunderstandings, frictions, delays and compromises.
The Zambian partnership does not escape these drawbacks.
The benefits of joint ventures have been canvassed at great length
but it is now recognized that they are best seen more as a vehicle for
change than as a permanent structure. On these lines Rosenstein-Rodan,
Streeten and Vernon 24 advocate that gradual transfer of ownership into local
hands should be scheduled as part of the initial joint venture agreement.
The case for such a transfer is particularly strong in those situations
where foreign participation - on the financial, managerial and technical
levels - becomes comple'tely redundant.
This phase-out formula is a long-term solution which the Zambian
partners might wish to consider, should the association last that long.
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Appendix I
AN EXTRACT OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA IS MAl"ERO SPEECH
ON ECONOMIC REFORMS
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I would now like to say a word or two on the mining companies. You
will recollect, Comrades, that last year I expressed my disappointment at
the virtual lack of mining development since Independence. I said of the
mining companies:
First of all, I want to say to the mining companies that
I am very disappointed at the virtual lack of mining develop-
ments since Independence. Apart from very small developments
at Kalengwa and Mimbula Fitula and some further development
at existing mines, we have seen nothing. The companies claim
that the royalty system has been against new development.
Nevertheless I think they have not done enough towards further
development of the country in which they make their great
profits. Let me also say that I do not agree with the mining
companies that royalties have been the obstacle to the
development of the industry. I have been following their
accounts and I know very well that they could have embarked
upon further expansion if they chose to devote part of their
profits for this purpose. Instead of re-investing they have been
distribution over 80 percent of their profits every year as
dividends.
I am afraid, having gone into the matter very thoroughly in my capa-
city as Minister of Mines, I now hold even stronger views than I did last
year. You are all familiar as to how Cecil Rhodes and his clique in the
British South Africa Company, at the beginning of the century, acquired
mineral concessions from our chiefs. On Independence we took over the min-
eral rights which were held by the British South Africa Company. However,
in practice this meant nothing except that we were able to levy a royalty
on the extraction of minerals from our own soils.
We found that all areas which were rich in mineral deposits were
passed on in perpetuity by the British South Africa Company to the two major
mining groups, the Anglo American Corporation and the Rhodesian Selection
Trust which is now the Road Selection Trust.
If you examine a geological map of Zambia you will find that most of
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the northern area of the country, the Copperbelt and the North-Western
Province, is shared between these two groups. These groups hold the mining
rights in perpetuity, i.e., forever and ever. All we obtained on Inde-
pendence was the right to charge a royalty on the value of the minerals
which were extracted from our soils. However, in order to charge the
royalty we had to wait for the pleasure of the mining companies to develop
a mine. Since they had the mining rights in perpetuity they were not
particularly in a hurry to embark upon further development. We, as a
people's Government, had legally no power to force them. We, as a people's
Government, had legally no power to take away their mining rights and offer
them to other groups which were willing and able to commence new mining
developments. Regardless of whether we needed development very badly we
could not safeguard against a possible drop in the price of copper and
consequent loss of Government revenues which would bring a halt to our
development plans, present and future. We could not tell the mining com-
panies, you either develop the areas which you have or we shall take them
away from you and give them to somebody else who is willing to do so. We
could not even tell them we shall take them away and develop them ourselves
in the interests of the nation. The Constitution-which was handed down to
us by our previous colonial masters made sure that we did not have this
power.
Clause 18 of the Constitution was inserted for this specific purpose.
And what is worse, clause 18 could not be repealed by an Act of Parliament
but only by a Referendum and in order to win the Referendum the Government,
as I explained earlier, had to get a YES vote from at least 51 percent of
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all the voters registered on the Voters· Roll.
Now that the nation has given me the mandate through the Referendum
I am able to announce far-reaching mining economic reforms which will set
this nation well and truly on the road to its economic independence. In
the interest of the nation and depending on the mandate that it gave me on
the 17th June, 1969, I hereby proclaim that all rights of ownership or
partial ownership of minerals must revert to the state. These include:
(1) The North Charterland Concession which covers almost the
entire Eastern Province and which is owned by LONRHO.
(2) The Rhodesian Katanga Concessions around the Mkushi area
and which is partially owned by a British Company called
the Tanganyika Concessions.
(3) The Big Concession which is partially owned by the African
Gold and Base Metal Holdings, an affiliate of the Anglo
American Corporation.
(4) Six ten-square mile areas, partially owned by Bechuanaland
Exploration Company.
Three ten-square mile areas which are partially owned
by the Kafue Development Company.
Rhodesia Railway Farms.
Kawimbe Farm and Nyamokolo Farms entirely owned by the
London Missionary Society.
These Concessions I just mentioned gave the holders the right to all
minerals in the areas. In addition, they gave them the right to explore
and mine these minerals for their own account without even paying royalty
to the State. Furthermore, they gave them the right to grant mining rights
to others and charge a royalty for their own benefit.
We have been trying since Independence to negotiate with the holders
to purchase back these concessions in the interests of the nation. We were
faced with demands amounting to as high as half a million kwacha and this
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only for some of them.
Comrades, this is an important moment for this young nation. As I
have said already, in the interests of the nation and upon the mandate that
it gave me on the 17th June, 1969, I hereby announce that I shall be can-
celling all these concessions.
I shall now deal with the other types of Mineral Rights.
Litunga's Rights. The Litunga holds rights to determine conditions
of prospecting licences, mining leases~ etc., and to claim royalty on
minerals in certain areas. I am afraid I have to terminate these rights
completely and without compensation. The rights of the Litunga should not
be different to those of our other traditional rulers. The rights of the
Litunga are not different to those of the nation, and I and my Government
are the elected custodians of the interests of the nation. The Litunga can
rest assured, however, that we shall exercise these rights in the best
interests of the nation as a whole.
Exclusive Prospecting Licences. These confer the right to prospect
for the discovery of minerals in specified areas in the country. There are
a number of such licences in existence~ most of them extending up to the end
of 1970. I am going to allow these licences to cover their full course but
the holders of these licences will have to accept the new conditions that I
shall impose upon them. The most important condition is that the State will
have the right to take up (at least) 51 percent of the shares in any mine
that may be established as a result of a discovery of Minerals.
Special Grants and Mining Locations. These are the rights that Cecil
Rhodes and his successors, the British South Africa Company, have passed on
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mainly to the two mining groups in Zambia to enjoy in perpetuity, i.e.
forever and ever.
These Special Grants cover vast areas of the country. Some of them
have been lying idle, and the holders of the Special Grants did not even
make an attempt to explore in these areas the existence of minerals.
Some of them are in the process of being explored now.
Some of them have been explored and minerals have, in fact, been
discovered.
Some others represent the existing mines on the Copperbelt and else-
where.
Now, Comrades, I intend to tell you how I propose to deal with th~l.
Before that, let me say again:
In the interests of the nation and upon the mandate it
gave me on the 17th June, 1969, all rights of ownership or
partial ownership of Minerals must revert to the State. Cecil
Rhodes 'perpetuity· or his 'forever and ever· is now buried
and I hope and pray never to rise again in th~ part of
Africa. I, therefore, proclaim that all Special Grants of any
type, whether they are lying idle or are in the process of
being explored, or contain minerals which have been discovered,
or contain mines which are in operation, will revert to the
State.
Having made this quite clear I must now reveal to you, Comrades~ how
I propose to deal with them;
FIRST
Existing Mines: Where there is a mine in operation I propose to give
the owners of the mine a lease to work the mine for twenty-five years. I am
afraid Cecil Rhodes has not lived in 'perpetuity·, i.e., 'forever and ever',
and I am not as generous as he was to give away national rights forever
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and ever to anyone. As I said, I shall give them a lease for twenty-five
years over an area immediately surrounding the mine which contains suffi-
cient are for them to keep them going over the period. The size of the
area will, therefore, depend on the rate of extraction. If they are pre-
pared to give me programmes for accelerated extraction they will get a
bigger area. If their extraction is slow they will naturally get a smaller
area.
SECOND
If the holders of a Special Grant have discovered a mineral deposit
they can have a choice: either they apply for an exploration licence which
will give them sufficient time to prepare a programme for mining develop-
ment with the subsequent right of a mining lease or they can apply directly
for a mining lease. The exploration licence will give them a period of
three years to complete their exploration and prepare their mining program-
me. The mining lease will cover adequate reserves to enable them to mine
for the period of twenty-five years. But they must fulfill one other condi-
tion. They must give the State the right to obtain 51 percent of the mining
venture.
THIRD
If the holders of the Special Grant are still exploring the area,
they will be able to apply for an Exclusive Prospecting Licence or an Explo-
ration Licence in order to complete their task. These licences will give
them the right to apply for a mining lease for twenty-five years if they
discover a mineral and they will give the State the right to obtain 51
percent of the mining venture.
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If they are not carrying out prospecting operations in their Special
Grants or if they cannot produce evidence that they have done so since
Independence they must hand the Special Grant back to the State immediately.
Before I leave this subject, Comrades, I must cover some anomalies of
the mining set-up and inform you how I propose to deal with them.
There are some small mines, especially in the Central Province,
which are being worked by small private individuals under tribute agree-
ment, with the holders of the Special Grant. In other words, these unfor-
tunate men slave away and sometimes are unable to make a living out of a
small mine and yet they have to pay a percentage to the holders of the
Special Grant who most of the time are not even residents of the country.
When in difficulties these small-scale miners have often received royalty
exemption from the Gover~ment. Yet they had to pay the tribute. Sometimes
they come to Government for financial assistance, which the holder of the
Special Grant refuses to provide and yet carries on receiving the tribute.
Comrades, I admire these small-scale miners. I admire their self-
denial, their hard work and their faith in the country. For this reason I
shall give them the right to apply for a mining lease and not the exploiters
who have been sitting back and enjoying the fruits of other peoplels labour.
The mining lease will, of course, be subject to the usual conditions,
including the rights of the State for participation.
The very last anomaly is the Bwana Mkubwa and Kansanshi Mines, the
so-called royalty-free mines. I do not intend to waste my breath, Comrades,
over this ridiculous issue. Bwana Mkubwa and Kansanshi, like all other
mines, will be entitled to a mining lease similar to those I have already
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described as applicable to existing mines.
I think, Comrades, you have already seen what I meant when I blamed
the mining companies for lack of mining development since Independence. If
they had all the areas which are potentially rich °in minerals under their
cOiltrol and they have done nothing to start new mines, I must blame them.
Of course, I do remember that one of their arguments was that the royalties
were too high and, as a result, they could not afford to develop new mines.
Countrymen, we have been charging the mini.lg companies royalties on
exactly the same formula as the British South Africa Company had been
charging them before Independence. Until Independence Day on the 24th
October, 1964, the mining companies were willingly paying the royalties that
the British South Africa Company was charging them. I do not remember that
they complained about it. I do not remember any of the chairmen of the
mining companies in their annual statements to their shareholders complain-
ing that the royalties charged by the British South Africa Company were too
high. But after Independence we have been hearing nothing else.
Countrymen, all the same I always say that wise men do not live in
the past. Last year, I promised that I would review the royalty formula and
that I would base it on profitability in order to meet the mining companies'
point of view. I like to think that we keep our promises and I now wish to
announce the new royalty system which will incorporate the export tax which
is in existence at the moment.
Instead of royalties and instead of the export tax I ask the mining
companies to pay 51 percent of their profits in the form of a new mineral tax
which I intend to introduce. The mineral tax, which replaces the royalties
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and copper export taxt is based on profit and in this I have met the moining
companies· demands 100 percent.
I wish to clarify this so that there is no shadow of misunderstanding
that the mineral tax is being introduced to replace the royalty and export
tax. It has nothing to do with income tax which naturally will have to be
paid on the balance of profits.
I wish now to explain the method of collection of the mineral tax.
As you know, royalty and export tax ~re collected almost immediately
whereas taxes based on profits have to wait until audited accounts become
available and until my Minister of Finance, through his Commissioner of
Taxes, has had time to calculate the amount of tax payable. However, we
cannot afford to give the mining companies a tax holiday until their
audited accounts are ready before they pay the mineral tax. We need to
collect this tax immediately because we need the money for our development
plans. The mineral tax will, therefore, be collected on the PAVE basis in
the form of a fixed charge per ton of copper produced. This will be cal-
culated and announced by the Minister responsible for Mines at three-month
intervals, in the light of prevailing conditions, so as the total collected
in the form of a fixed charge will be as close as possible to the Government
share of the anticipated profits. NaturallYt when the accounts of the
mines are ready an adjustment will be made so as the total payment shall not
exceed, or fall short, of the 51 percent of the total taxable profits.
Comrades, I have given a great deal of thought to the mining economic
reforms which I have just announced. I am confident that they cover every
aspect of mining development past, present and future and I have no doubt
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that they will lead to an increase of mining investment. However, when I
opened the subject I said that I wanted the mining economic reforms to set
the Nation well and truly towards its economic independence. I do not
think that this can be achieved without the Nation acquiring full control
of the existing mines, as it intends to do for the mines which will open
from now on.
I have, therefore, decided that I shall ask the owners of the mines
to invite the Government to join their mining enterprises. I am asking the
owners of the mines to give 51 percent of thei'~ shares to the State.
I wish to remind the owners of the mines, that according to the
exchange control regulations, they can only remit 50 percent of their pro-
fits outside the country. I wish to point out to them that it is to their
advantage to offer 51 percent of their shares to the Government in that as
a result and in line with what I announced earlier their remittance of
dividends will no longer be subject to exchange control.
I also wish them to know that the Governmentls business record is
excellent and the companies, which have associated themselves with INDEeO
in line with last yearls Mulungushi Reforms, are perfectly happy and
satisfied with INDECQl s businesslike appraoch, both in concluding the
negotiations and subsequently in managing the enterprises under its control.
This year again I intend to leave it to INDEeD to negotiate the value
and terms of payment but again I want to make it clear that what INDEeD will
pay is a fair value represented by the book value. At the same time I want
to make it clear that Government has no money to pay as a deposit against
these shares; it also cannot afford to release part of the min~ral tax or
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the income tax in payment for these shares. The revenue from the mineral
tax and the income tax is badly needed for our development programme.
INDEeD will, therefore, have to negotiate payment out of future dividends
bearing in mind the advantage the shareholders will derive from associating
with the State.
Before I leave this subject, I must say a few words about my plans
for future mining development. As you have seen, I am giving the mining
companies twenty-five years to operate, under Government control, all mines
working for profit. I am giving them the opportunity to prepare plans for
mining development for ar~as which they have already explored and where
they have located minerals. I am also giving them the opportunity to com-
plete their investigation in areas where they are carrying out prospecting
now and prepare programmes for mining development if they locate mineral
deposits. But they will have to surrender, immediately the Parliament
passes the necessary legislation, all other areas which they hold in perpe-
tuity forever and ever.
These areas, as I said, ~ill revert to the State and in my capacity
as Head of State and as Minister of Mines I shall procure groups from other
parts of the world to come and develop these mines as a joint venture with
the State. The new rules which will apply in regard to future mining
development, whether by the mining companies already operating in Zambia or
by new ones to come, will be as follows:
First and foremost. all minerals belong to the Nation and
cannot be given to anybody in perpetuity. They will only be
leased for periods of up to twen~y-five years for exploitation
by companies 1n which the State holds at least 51 percent of
the shares. In other words, from now on all new mining com-
panies, which are going to emerge. will be controlled by the
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State and the State will have the majority on their boards of
directors. I am confident, Comrades, that many organizations
from many parts of the world will come forward and establish
mining ventures jointly with the Government of Zambia.
For the sake of our investors, I now wish to olltline the procedure
which will be followed in the future for the establishment of new mines.
Potential investors will obtain a prospecting licence or an explora-
tion licence to look for minerals. These licences will have two main condi-
tions:
(1) That if they locate minerals they will be entitled as of
right to a mining lease not exceeding twenty-five years.
(2) That the State will be entitled to obtain 51 percent of
the mining venture.
When the State participates in a new mining venture it will un~ake ~,
to pay its share in the Prospecting an~ Exploration expenses which have al-
ready been incurred. If no minerals are located, however, the prospecting
and exploration costs will be the entire responsibi1ity of the investor~
A new mine will be subject to the same conditions as all other mines,
and therefore subject to the payment of mineral tax. However~ the Minister
responsible for mines will have the right to postpon~ the payment of mineral
tax or even exempt the mine altogether from payment for a number of years
until the operation of the mine has reached satisfactory profitability.
I wish to take this opportunity to remind our mining companies and at
the same time inform potential investors of our extremely generous tax
incentives for new mining development provided for in our already existing
income tax legislation.
According to the Income Tax Act of 1966 the following most favourable
allowances have been provided:
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Any capital expenditure incurred in the first year of
opening a mine is divided by five. One-fifth of the capital
expenditure is, therefore, written off against profits in the
first year. In the second year, the balance from the first
year, which has not been allowed, ;s added to the capital
expenditure in the second year, and this figure is divided
by four. Therefore, a quarter ;s written off. In the third
year to the balance which has so far not been written off is
added to capital expenditure of the third year and one-third
;s written off. This process continues until the fifth year,
when all the outstanding capital expenditure and the capital
expenditure for that year is all written off. From that time
on, all capital expenditure in a given tax year is allowable
as a deduction against the profits of the company.
It can, therefore, be seen from this summary that we are encouraging
mining operators to open new mines by allowing all capital expenditure to
be written off against the profits of the company. I must emphasise that
the provisions only apply to the mining operations of a mining company and
not to any other interests they may have.
On my part and indeed on your behalf I want to assure potential
investors in this field that we intend that all these companies in which the
State has majority control shall be run on strictly businesslike lines.
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MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTANCY CONTRACT
ReM and NCCM agreed to enter into separate management and consultancy
contracts with RST and a company within the Anglo-American group. Details
of the RST contract are given below. The Zamanglo contract is in similar
terms, although the precise details have not been disclosed.
Management and Consultancy Functions
IIRST shall provide to ReM all managerial, financ'ial, commercial,
technical and other services which, prior to 1st January, 1970 were supplied
or procured by the RST group to Mufulira, Luanshy and Mwinilunga with the
intention that the business affairs and operations of ReM shall be mainta;n~
ed in a manner nu less efficient and standard no less than those before
1st January, 1970, and which shall be directed towards the optimization of
production and profit of ReM and any subsidiary companies. 1I These services
include:
1. Technical services such as IIpreparing progress reports, short
and long term plans and viability studies for maintaining, expanding, or
improving operations and production, capital expenditure estimates, advice
on operating problems in the mining, geological. rnetallurgical und engineer-
ing activities, advice on scheduling copper production, recommending poli-
cies on ore reserves. researc~ and development, and the provision or
procurement of further technical services if reasonably called upon to do
50. 11
2. General services lIin connection will all aspects of ReMis
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business and operations, including advice on the preparation of company
reports and financial statements, production and marketing~ financial
matters, development and processing of minerals, operational research,
work-study, computers and management information services, labor relations,
public relations, purchasing services and all aspects of the administration
of ReMis affairs. 1I
3. Specialized services
all Civil, metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, structural and
m'i ni ng engi neeri ng servi ces; ; n other words, RST wi 11 act as
engineering consultants to ReM.
b. Recruitment of expatriate staff required by ReM. Contracts
relating to the terms and conditions of service of recruits will
be determined by RCM.
c. Purchasing services on behalf of ReM outside Zambia on a
cost reimbursable basis. These services are exclusive to RST
until June 30, 1971 t but may be terminated by ReM giving twelve
months· notice to expire at any time after June 30, 1972. RCM
will fulfill its own purchasing requirements within Zambia.
4. Provision of personnel: . IIReM shall employ such personnel as may
be necessary or desirable for the efficient operation of its business. RST
shall procure the provision of staff either by recruitment for ReM, or by
attachment or transfer of RST personnel. The cost of administration of and
the emoluments of attached personnel will be borne by ReM. The terms and
conditions of employment shall be attractive enough to ensure th~ recruit-
ment and retention of suitable personnel. 1I
Remuneration
Remuneration to RST under the contract will be as follows:
1. The amount of.75 percent of ReMis gross sales proceeds.
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2. Two percent of RCM's consolidated profits after charging "all
revenue expenditure and outgoings and after provision for replacements and
mineral tax and after the deduction of all the fees payable by RCM to RST
under their agreement, but before all other income tax and before deduction
of reserves. II
3. An engineering service fee of 3 percent of the constructed cost
of projects undertaken by RCM IIwhi ch i nvo'l ve expendi ture on capi ta1 «( count
or expenditure on such replacement items as involve improvement of moderni-
zation but excluding all items, whether capital or replacement, which RCM
on the recommendation of the Managing Director may decide to undertake it-
self."
4. A recruiting fee of 15 percent of total emoluments (before
taxes) payable in respect of each expatriate employee's first year.
Managing Director
RST wi 11 nomi nate one of the IIB II di rectors of ReM as Managi ng
Director and "shall afford such assistance as RCM shall, through its
Managing Director, request of both an executive and as advisory nature
towards effecting the policies and directions of the Board of ReM and
towards the general management of RCM's business and specifically directed
towards the optimization by RCM of production and profit."
Terms of Contract
The Contract shall be deemed to ha'.'e commenced on 1st January, 1970
and shall continue in force until terminated as follows:
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(a) by RST or ReM on glvlng to the other two years prior written
notice to expire on any date after 31st December, 1979;
(b) by ReM on notice in writing if at any time RST shall cease to
own the Prescribed Minimum Interest (ad defined below). In the event
that this Interest is not held by RST at any time before 1st July,
1972, the notice shall be one month, otherwise it shall be two
years, provided that termination shall not take effect if RST
restores its Minimum Prescribed Interest within three months of the
date of service of the notice or the period of notice, whichever is
the shorter;
(c) by RST on two years notice in writing if advice material to
the conduct and development of the business of ReM is repeatedly
not accepted or implemented by the IIA II Directors of ReM; or
(d) by ReM on two years notice in writing if the performance by
RST of its duties under the Contract shall fall below the standard
hitherto exercised by the RST Group in the management of the
businesses of ReM and its predecessors, so as to prejudice the
efficient operation of the business of ReM or any significant part
thereof~ unless such a fall in standards is the result of circum-
stances beyond the reasonable control of RST or from obstructions by
ReM.
PRESCRIBED MINIMUM INTEREST
RST and Zamanglo agreed in terms of the Master Agreement to maintain
a 20 percent beneficial interest (direct or indirect) in the issued equity
capi ta1 of ReM and NCCM respect; vely unt'j 1 July 1, 1972. Therefore, if
RST or Zamanglo ceases to hold this interest at any time before July 1,
1972, the Master Agreements would be breached. In these circumstances, the
management t sales, and marketing arrangements could be terminated by ReM
or NCCM on one monthls not;~e.
After July 1. 1972, RST and Zamanglo are at liberty to dispose of
their "prescribed minimum interest" in RC~1 and NCCM respectively" in terms of
the Master Agreements. However. in this event. ReM or NCCM may give two
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years· notice of termination of the management and sales contracts provided
that termination shall not take effect if RST or Zamanglo restore its
prescribed minimum interest within a prescribed period of time.
SALES AND MARKETING CONTRACT
Similar agreements were made with the RST and Zamanglo groups for
services to be provided under sales and marketing contracts with ReM and
NCCM respectively. The details below are taken from the RST contract.
With regard to marketing functions, the RST sales and marketing con-
tract states:
RST shall provide and ensure the continuation of sales
and marketing services for ReM of a standard that prior to
1st January 1970 were supplied or procured by the RST Group
to Mufulira, Luanshya and Mwinilunga with the intention
that the sales and marketing business and operations of ReM
shall be maintained in a manner no less efficient and to an
extent and standard no less than those given before 1st
January 1970, and shall be directed towards the optimization
of profit of ReM and any subsidiary companies.
The contract also includes the following provisions:
1. Exclusive agency. IIRST will be the exclusive agent of ReM in
every country for the purpose of finding purchasers for all ores, metals and
minerals and any by-products recovered from the mining or treatment of ores,
metals or minerals produced by ReM and any subsidiaries from time to time. 1I
2. Perfonnance. IIRST's obligations may be performed by the exist-
ing sales facilities of the RST Group, but an appointment of new agents must
have the approval of ReM. 1I
3. Sales obligations. IIRST shall, as ReMis agents, in accordance
with the general policy of the ReM Board, use its best endeavors to secure
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contracts with customers at the best prices and on such terms and condi-
tions as may be determined by ReM from time to time on the advice of RS1~.1I
Remuneration will be based on .75 percent of gross sales proceeds
for all sales throughout the world of copper metal and 2.5 percent on
cobalt sales. No commission will be payable on sales to the ZimeD group of
companies for their own consumption for purposes of fabrication.
The terms of the sales and marketing contracts with regard to
commencement and termination follow those in each management and consultancy
contract.
With regard to staff attachments, the RST sales and marketing
contract states: IIRST shall provide facilities for the attachment of em-
ployees of Mindeco or of RCM to RSTls organization providing services to
ReM in respect of marketing and selling. RST shall give each such employee
full and proper experience within the organization,lI at RCMls expense.
TAXATION
The Zambian Government made several tax concessions to the RST and
Zamanglo groups in connection with the takeover. The most important of
these were:
1. In order to facilitate the corporate reorganization of the
Zamanglo and RST groups pursuant to the acquisition by government of its 51
percent interest, the Zambian Government provided for the exemption of the
Schemes of Arrangement involved in such reor~Janization (including the
reduction of capital by RST) from all Zambian taxes and stamp duties.
2. The Zambian Government has agreed that the overall rate of tax
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payable by RCM and NCCM shall not be increased so long as any part of the
Zimeo loan stock 1982 or Zimeo bonds 1978, as the case may be~ is outstand-
ing (i.e., a maximum tax rate of 73.05 percent of gross profits)~
3. The Zambian Government agreed to enact legislation to ensure
that the companies did not incur any tax that would not have been incurred
(or lose any relief to which they would have been entitled) if the takeover
had not taken place
4. The government agreed that all payments with respect to the
bonds and loan stock would be exempt from all taxes in Zambia.
5. The government agreed that as long as any bonds and loan stock
were outstanding there could be no tax on dividends paid by ReM or NCCM to
Mindeco or other sharehulders who were neither citizens nor residents of
Zambia. In addition, both ReM and NCCM would not be subject to any discrim-
inatory stamp duty, excise tax, or import duty.
At the same time that the mines takeover was announced, the Zambian
Government announced certain changes in the tax laws relating to mining
generally (these are discussed at length in Chapters 6 and 8). In addition
to replacing royalty payments and export taxes by a mineral tax (income
tax remaining), the general provisions relating to capital allowances and
taxation of prospecting expenditure were enacted into law in the Income Tax
(Amendment) Act 1970 and the provisions relating specifically to the takeover
were enacted into law in the Income Tax (Special Provisions) Acts (No.1 and
2) 1970. The Zambian Government agreed that as long as the Zimeo bonds and
loan stock were outstanding none of the provisions of these acts would be
altered.
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EXCHANGE CONTROL
The Zambian Government agreed to exempt from exchange control the
fa 11 ow; ng:
1. All payments mad3 with respect to the ZimcD bonds and loan
stock except to Rhodesian residents.
2. All dividLnds and other payments in ReM and NCCM securities to
persons not resident or citizens of Zambia (non-Zambian shareholders can
freely conv~rt Zambian currency at the IMF parity rate).
3. All payments made in connection with both the management and
sales contracts.
4. All IIB II shares transferred to persons other than c; ti zens and
residents of Zambia.
The above exemptions are incorporated in the Mines Acquis;tion
(Special Provisions) Act 1970.
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
Dividends
ReM 'and NCCM will pay dividends to the holders of IIA" and IIB II shares
in an aggregate amount equal to the consolidated net profits of ReM and NCCM
respectively (and the respective subsidiaries) after deduction only of
appropriations in respect of capital expenditure, expenditure for explora-
tion and prospecting, and reserves for necessary working capital. Appropria-
tions for capital, exploration, or prospecting expenditures require the
approval of both IIA II and IIB II directors voting separately.
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Shareholder Protection
1. Preemptive rights: MINDECO (as holder of the "All shares) and
the holders of the IIB II shares have premptive rights entitling thenl to
subscribe to new issues of shares of the same class before such shares are
offered to the public.
2. Voting rights: Certain major corporate actions by HCM or NCCM
require the approval of both the IIA II and IIB II shareholders, voting separatel.y.
The corporate actions which require such approval are, inter alia: disposal
by ReM or NCCM of a substantial part of its assets or its concessions or
mining rights; the winding up, amalgamation or reconstruction of ReM or
NCCM; any change in the powers of the board of RCM or NCCM or any change in
the proportion of IIA II and IIB II directors or their voting rights; and major
changes in the ReM or NCCM Articles of Association (e.g., any change in the
provisions requiring separate approval of the IIB II directors described below).
3. IIB II director veto: The following are the main actions that
require the alternative votes of a majority of both the IIA II directors and
the IIB" directors, voting separately, IIwhich alternative vote shall not be
unreasonably withheld having regard to the interests of ReM (and NCCM) and
to the interests of the shareholders ll :
a. The winding up of ReM or NCCM or the appointment of a liquidator
for the purpose;
b. Any amalgamation or reconstruction of ReM or NCCM to which the
companies are a party;
c. Any disposal of all or any substantial part of the assets of
ReM or NCCM or the assignment or grant of any of their concessions,
mining or other substantial rights to others;
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d. Any cha:1ge in the proportion of IIA II directors to IIB II direc-
tors, in the directors· voting rights, or in the power of the
Board;
e. The engaging by RCM or NCCM in any business or activities of a
nature substantially different to the mining companies taken over,
or the expenditure by ReM or NCCM of any funds not in the ordinary
course of its business, or the making of any financial commitments
in respect of any new mini·ng operation or facility or the expansion
of an existing mining operation or facility in respect of which
commitments or expansion ReM or NCCM is unable to raise such monies
as nlay be required on corrmerc;ally competitive terms or in respect
of which the IIB II directors are not satisfied of the corrmercial vali-
d; ty;
f. -fhe issue of additional IIA II or 118 11 shares or the creation or
issue of any other class of share capital, or of securities con-
vertible into share capital, or the borrowing of any funds, whether
by the issue of bonds or other securities;
g. The sale of any products or the making of any purchases other
than for cash, or at a price or on condition other than those in
general application and use in the relevant world market, or for any
currency that ;s not freely convertible;
h. Appropriation in respect of capital expenditure or expenditure
for exploration or prospecting (discussed above);
i. Any act, dealing, arrangement, or transaction that, in the opi-
nion of a majority of the IIB II directors, is not directed toward and/
or calculated to attain the optimization of production and profit
of ReM or NCCM; and
j. Variation or modification of any provlslon of the Memorandum and
Articles of Association of ReM or NCCM.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
As part of the takeover, the Zambian Government agreed to
adhere to the convention establishing the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In addition, the Master Agree-
ments require the Zambian Government and ReM and NCCM to enter into formal
arbitration agreements as soon as possible after the convention has been
121
ratified.
The Zambian Government and ZimcD agreed that a"11 disputes arising
under the following documents be governed by arbitration by lC510: (1)
Heads of Agreement; (2) any general agreement governing the transaction;
(3) the trust deed or indenture pursuant to which the bonds and loan stock
are issued; (4) the Memorandum and Articles of Association; (5) the
management and sales contract; and (6) any assurances given to foreign
shareholders or employees embod"ied in legislation enacted or agreements
entered in connection with the takeover.
The Master Agreements contain an interestinq provision with respect
to the law that will be applied in arbitration. In particular it is pro-
vided that all disputes be governed by IIfrozen Zambian law,1I i.e., the law
of Zambia (including its rules on the conflict of laws) as in force at the
date of execution of the Master Agreements, disregarding all legislation,
ins truments, orders, di recti ons, arid court dec; 5 ions havi ng the force of 1aw
in Zambia (other than those contemplated by the Master Agreements) adopted,
made, issued, or given subsequent to the date of execution of the Master
Agreements. In addition, the arbitrators may determine any dispute arising
under the Master Agreements in their discretion ex aequo et bono. (It should
be noted that all disputes other than those arising under the Master Agree-
ments are determined under IIfrozen Zambian law" only and not by ex ae~
et bono.)
OTHER GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKINGS
The Zambian Government also agreed (1) that ReM and NCCM would be per-
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mitted to conduct their operations on a commercial basis; (2) that the
provisions in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of ReM and NCCM
for the protection of all classes of shareholders would not be altered by
any change in the law of Zambia; and that no change in the law of Zambia
will alter or affect the legislation passed to give effect to the Master
Agreement.
ZAMBIAN LEGISLATION
In order to facilitate the takeover, the Zambian Parliament enacted
several laws that had the effect of making many of the key terms of the
Master Agreements part of the statute law of Zambia. Such legislation
included the following:
1. The Mines Acquisition (Special Provisions) Act, 1970. This act
contains provisions, inter alia: giving the Minister responsible for
Finance the poser to grant all guarantees and undertakings necessary to
implement the Master Agreements; exempting various documents and transac-
tions from stamp duties and transfer and registration fees; setting forth
the exemption from exchange control; and providing for the vesting of assets
in the new companies. In addition, in order to give the Zambian Government
the power to take immedi ate action in the. event of unforeseen ci rcums tances
arising in connection with the takeover, the act contained a clause giving
the President power to make amendments to existing laws by statutory
instrument if such amendments were necessary to give effect to the Master
Agreements and to do anything necessary or expedient to give full and com-
plete effect to the Master Agreements.
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2. Tax legislation: As indicated above, the provisions of the
Master Agreements relating to taxation were enacted into law by the Income
Tax (Special Provisions) Act 1970 and th2 Income Tax (Amendment) Act 1970.
3. The Mines Acguisition (Special Provisions No.2) Act 1970.
As a part of its group reorganization, Zambian Anglo-American Limited
decided that it would change its domicile from Zambia to Bermuda. In order
to facilitate this move, the Zambian Parliament enacted an unusual piece of
legislation that enabled Zamanglo to cease to be incorporated in Zambia
without winding up. Bermuda enacted complementary legislation to enable
Zamanglo to continue its business in Bermuda as a going concern. The combi-
nation of the Zambian and Bermudan legislation enabled Zamanglo to transfer
its domicile as a going concern without winding up.
4. Investments Disputes Convention Act 1970. As part of its
agreement to join ICSID, it was necessary for the Zambian Government to pro-
vide for the recognition and enforcement of any ICSID award in Zambia. The
Investment Dispute Convention Act 1970 provides, inter alia, that any ICSID
award will have the same force and effect in Zambia as a judgment of the
Zambian High Court.
THE MINES AND MINERALS ACT OF 1969
Although the Mines and Minerals Act of 1969 was not specifically part
of the takeover arrangements, provision was made in the Master Agreements
for both RST and Zamanglo to have first option on those mining rights that,
under the 1969 Mines and Minerals Act reverted to the State on January 1,
1970. This legislation made provisions for the State to have an option, to
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a maximum of 51 percent, of any mining ventures arising from the issue of
any new prospecting and exploration licence after January 1, 1970.
